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In this article, originally presented as a David C. Baum Me-
morial Lecture on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights at the University
of Illinois College of Law, Professor William Eskridge critically
examines the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, where the Court held, in a 5-4 opinion, that "ho-
mosexual sodomy" between consenting adults in the home did not
enjoy a constitutional protection of privacy and could be criminal-
ized by state statute. Because the Court's opinion critically relied
on an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, Professor Es-
kridge reconstructs the history and jurisprudence of sodomy laws
in the United States until the present day. He argues that the Hard-
wick ruling rested upon an anachronistic treatment of sodomy reg-
ulation at the time of the Fifth (1791) or Fourteenth (1868)
Amendments. Specifically, the Framers of those amendments could
not have understood sodomy laws as regulating oral intercourse
(Michael Hardwick's crime) or as focusing on "homosexual sod-
omy" (the Court's focus). Moreover, the goal of sodomy regula-
tion before this century was to assure that sexual intimacy occur in
the context of procreative marriage, an unconstitutional basis for
criminal law under the Court's privacy jurisprudence. In short,
Professor Eskridge suggests that the Court's analysis of sodomy
laws had virtually no connection with the historical understanding
of eighteenth or mid-nineteenth century regulators. Rather, the
Court's analysis reflected the Justices' own preoccupation with
"homosexual sodomy" and their own nervousness about the right
of privacy previous Justices had found in the penumbras of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court's problematic historiography
deepens the normative problems other scholars have identified for
Hardwick and illustrates conceptual difficulties with the "original
understanding" methodology the Court sometimes deploys in con-
stitutional cases.
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Michael Bowers, adulterer,' and Michael Hardwick, sodomite,
were forever joined as a couple when the latter challenged Georgia's
application of its criminal sodomy law to consensual oral sex between
two adult men. Hardwick maintained that such application violated
the right to privacy the Supreme Court has found in the Due Process
Clause. Bowers, then Attorney General of Georgia, defended the
law's constitutionality. Hardwick won in the court of appeals, Bowers
in the Supreme Court.' Although the Georgia sodomy law prohibited
oral and anal intercourse between two people of either sex, Justice
Byron White's opinion for a five-Justice majority in Bowers v. Hard-
wick ruled that the "only claim properly before the Court... is Hard-
wick's challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual
homosexual activity."3 Narrowed in this way, Hardwick's claim was
distinguishable from those in earlier cases where the Court had in-
voked a constitutional right of privacy, for those cases had arisen in
the context of procreation and heterosexual intimacy.4 Central to the
Court's analysis was its belief that the due process right of privacy
could only be applied to protect those fundamental liberties "'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."" Because homosexual
sodomy had long been criminal in Anglo-American law, the Court
held that there was no "deeply rooted" liberty Hardwick could claim6
and, indeed, that Hardwick's fundamental rights claim was "at best,
facetious."7 The Court then asked whether Georgia had a rational ba-
sis for its sodomy law and found such a basis in a "presumed belief of
a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable" and in "majority sentiments about the
morality of homosexuality."8
The Court's decision in Hardwick has become infamous, partly
because Justice White went out of his way to focus on and disrespect
"homosexual sodomy" and "homosexuality."9 The focus on homosex-
uality was also pronounced in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opin-
ion, which relied on "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards"
and "millennia of moral teaching[s]" to emphasize that "the act of
homosexual sodomy" cannot be treated as any kind of fundamental
right.1° The association of sodomy with homosexuality did not come
1. See Kevin Sack, Georgia Candidate for Governor Admits Adultery and Resigns Com-
mission in Guard, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at Al.
2. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Id. at 188 n.2.
4. See id. at 190-91 (distinguishing, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
5. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
6. See id. at 194.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 196.
9. See id. at 189-90, 195-96.
10. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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out of thin air, for it resonated in the popular mind, and by 1986 seven
states had made consensual sodomy a crime only for same-sex part-
ners, with three others following this course shortly after Hardwick."
Nonetheless, this kind of rhetoric turned the Hardwick decision into a
litmus test for legal homophobia: If you supported the decision, espe-
cially if you failed to disclaim the rhetoric, you were signaling an-
tihomosexual feelings,and perhaps also an insecurity about your own
sexuality. (It did not help matters that the critical fifth vote for the
majority, Justice Lewis Powell, was reported to have switched his vote
after intense lobbying from the Chief Justice; Powell himself fueled
Hardwick's bad odor when he later proclaimed it the vote he most
regretted.' 2 ) Although gay people are predictably critical of the deci-
sion, respected academic commentators, most of them nongay, have
strongly criticized Hardwick as manipulative,' 3 ignorant and ineffi-
cient,' 4 violent,' 5 historically inaccurate,' 6 misogynistic,' 7 authorita-
rian,'8 and contrary to precedent. 9 If some of the Justices aimed to
disrespect homosexuality, they ended up wounding the Court.
Institutionally, the Court sought to atone for Hardwick in Romer
v. Evans,2 which invalidated a Colorado initiative preventing state
and local government units from carrying out laws or policies whereby
"homosexual... orientation" could be the basis for any positive legal
claim. The Court emphasized two features of the initiative, either as-
sertedly fatal to its constitutionality even under the easy-to-pass ra-
tional basis standard of review. On the one hand, the initiative,
"unprecedented in our jurisprudence," sought to accomplish some-
11. These seven states are Arkansas (1977), Kansas (1969), Kentucky (1974), Missouri
(1977), Montana (1973), Nevada (1977), and Texas (1973). Soon to join this array were
Oklahoma (judicial decision, 1986), Tennessee (1989), and Maryland (judicial decision, 1990).
Nevada repealed its same-sex sodomy misdemeanor in 1993. Courts in Kentucky (1992), Mon-
tana (1997), and Tennessee (1996) struck down their laws as violations of state constitutional
privacy rights. For precise references, see the Appendix.
12. See Al Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in Sodomy Case, WASH. POST, July 13, 1986, at
Al; Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3; see
also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 513-30 (1994) (recounting story of Powell's
deliberation, including the statement by Powell that he had never met a "homosexual").
13. See generally EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990);
Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79
VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).
14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 341-50 (1992).
15. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1461
(1992).
16. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1102-03 (1988).
17. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meanings of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 187, 229-31.
18. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747 (1989); see also
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1987).
19. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw-ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1422-
31 (2d ed. 1988).
20. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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thing the state could not do, namely, "singl[e] out a certain class of
citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships."'" On the
other hand, "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable infer-
ence that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected." 2 Evans not only situates the Supreme
Court in a more neutral position as regards homosexuality, but calls
Hardwick itself into question.
To focus sodomy prohibitions on "homosexual sodomy" alone, as
Hardwick suggested and as ten states have expressly done, is to
"singl[e] out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status" be-
cause of popular "animosity toward the class of persons affected." The
Hardwick decision itself illustrates how modern prejudice against gay
people seizes upon their presumptive commission of sodomy and to-
talizes their identity around those acts. As popular stereotypes about
gay people have been called into question, the components of this re-
gime have been discredited and expressly antihomosexual sodomy
laws ought to meet the same fate. Reconceiving Georgia's sodomy law
in a manner contrary to the statutory text, Hardwick found a rational
basis for Georgia's sodomy law in the "presumed belief of a majority
of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable."23 Evans struck down a law that rested upon the actual,
voted-upon belief of a majority of the electorate in Colorado that
homosexuals are immoral and equal rights for them unacceptable.24
To satisfy Evans, an antihomosexual law requires something more
than popular animosity.2 It is hard to make such a showing for con-
sensual private intercourse between gay adults such as Michael Hard-
wick and his partner.
Because Evans involved an unusually targeted denial of rights to
gay people as a class, "unprecedented in our jurisprudence,' 26 and fo-
cused on homosexual status rather than conduct (sodomy), it is inac-
curate to say that the decision overrules Hardwick, even implicitly; the
Georgia sodomy law did not on its face focus on same-sex sodomy.
But the two decisions do not rest easily together in the same logic set.
Stigmatizing an entire class of peaceful citizens as criminals because of
their private, consensual behavior has a more pronounced effect on
gay people than Colorado's antigay initiative probably would have
had, and Evans's rhetoric of inclusion suggests a broader reading. Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia recognized this in his Evans dissent. "If it is consti-
tutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal [Hardwick], surely it is constitutionally permissible for a
21. Id. at 633.
22. Id. at 634.
23. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (emphasis added).
24. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 622-25.
25. See id. at 630-34.
26. Id. at 633.
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State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct," or"merely prohibiting all levels of state government from bestowing spe-
cial protections upon homosexual conduct [Evans]. '27 The six-Justice
Evans majority failed to deny, much less refute, this assertion. Now
that Evans has been decided, the assertion can be reversed: If it is
constitutionally impermissible for the state to enact laws disfavoring
people who engage in "homosexual conduct," then is it not impermis-
sible to penalize the conduct itself?
Once Hardwick's rationalization of sodomy laws as antihomosex-
ual measures falters, the states prohibiting only same-sex sodomy can
no longer defend their laws easily, if at all. Indeed, four of the ten
states with such discriminations have, since Hardwick, repealed (Ne-
vada) or judicially invalidated (Kentucky, Tennessee, Montana) their
same-sex only sodomy laws.28 Additionally, states criminalizing all
sodomy must defend their laws by reference to heterosexual as well as
homosexual sodomy. This, too, would not be easy. If sodomy laws
were applied to consensual heterosexual intimacy, they could only be
defended by reference to the policy of limiting sex to the context of
procreative marriage, a policy the Supreme Court has repeatedly re-
jected as a justification for invading privacy rights. The right of privacy
already assures heterosexuals the right to avoid procreation by contra-
ception when they engage in penile-vaginal intercourse.29 It is a mod-
est step further to allow heterosexuals to commit sodomy, which is
another way that heterosexuals can enjoy sexual pleasure without
risking unwanted pregnancies. At least three-quarters of the straight
population, including the President of the United States, have en-
gaged in oral sex (many of them regularly), and almost a fourth have
engaged in anal sex.30 It would be absurd to brand all these people
criminals, yet that is what a neutral regime criminalizing consensual
sodomy would do.
The foregoing is the nutshell case for rethinking Hardwick. The
remainder of this article considers the matter in greater detail and
from the point of view of the original opinion. Justice White's key
argument was that privacy rights could only be extended to conduct
traditionally left alone, which "sodomy" had not been in Anglo-
American history.3 ' Part I of this article challenges Justice White's
27. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); accord John Finnis, Law, Morality,
and Sexual Orientation, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994).
28. 1993 Nev. Stat. 515; Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v.
State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
(appeal to state supreme court denied).
29. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., Tim SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEX-
UAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 98-99 tbl.3.6 (1994); see also H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at
30 (1998) (providing a detailed account of consensual and oral sex between male president and
female intern).
31. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
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methodology as inconsistent with the Court's privacy precedents,
which posed the inquiry at a more general level. The focus of the pre-
Hardwick privacy precedents was the general assurance of personal
liberty to deploy one's body and form relationships, not the specific
presence or absence of regulations for particular deployments or rela-
tionships in the nineteenth century. The abortion cases, for example,
were wrongly decided under Justice White's approach. Moreover, the
intimate activities protected by the Court's precedents suggested lib-
ertarian or anticommandeering principles just as hostile to the appli-
cation of sodomy laws to oral sex between consenting adults, as to the
application of contraception laws to adults having penile-vaginal sex.
Part II of this article assumes that Justice White's highly particu-
larist inquiry was set at the appropriate level but challenges his histori-
cal account. Although sodomy was illegal in most states in 1868, what
Michael Hardwick was doing was clearly illegal in no state until 1879.
The colonial and state sodomy laws surveyed by Justice White to
prove Hardwick's privacy claim "facetious" criminalized only anal in-
tercourse, including different-sex intercourse. The private oral sex
Hardwick committed was not sodomy and was not regulated in any
state before 1879; oral sex between two men and men and women was
regulated by new laws adopted between 1879 and 1921; oral sex be-
tween two women was unregulated in most states until the twentieth
century. Not only does part II document the Court's error in under-
standing Hardwick's conduct as historical sodomy, but it shows how
anachronistic Justice White was being to attribute "homosexual sod-
omy" as the regulatory object of nineteenth-century statutes. The fo-
cus of sodomy laws was to regulate nonprocreative and possibly
nonconsensual insertions of the male penis, not to stigmatize "homo-
sexuality." It was only in this century that sodomy laws have become
understood as stigmatizing "homosexual" conduct, including intimacy
among women.
Part III of this article ponders the consequences of Justice
White's anachronisms. A historiographically sophisticated history of
sodomy laws reveals the deep tension between their moralizing re-
gime of compulsory procreation and the precise holdings of the
Court's privacy precedents, which make that an impermissible state
purpose. The multiple incongruences between Hardwick and histori-
ography not only undermine the authority of that particular precedent
but also illustrate difficulties with original understanding methodolo-
gies more generally.
1. CRITIQUE OF HARDWiCK'S ANALYSIS OF PRECEDENT
Although "privacy" is not named as a protected right in the U.S.
Constitution, American judges since the mid-nineteenth century have
read constitutional assurances of "due process of law" to have a sub-
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stantive libertarian component.32 In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Botsford,3 3 for example, the Supreme Court held that the state could
not require people to submit to physical examinations. The right to
bodily integrity formed the core of the early right to privacy, but the
Court saw the right to include intimate associations as well. Summing
up prior cases, the Supreme Court in 1923 explained that the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause includes "not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children. '34 This
was a traditionalist vision of privacy. Significant in this catalogue of
constitutional liberties was the omission of sexual liberty. This omis-
sion was underscored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion in
Buck v. Bell 35 which treated as a routine matter Virginia's forced ster-
ilization of mentally disabled people. Reflecting the ideology of
American degeneracy theorists as well as the progressives' disinclina-
tion to allow judges to tinker with legislated social engineering,
Holmes was pretty satisfied with himself for writing a dismissive opin-
ion. But the next generation of judges was more likely to believe that
sexuality is a key feature of one's personal development and, there-
fore, a liberty as fundamental as family.36
Thus, the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma37 struck down a steriliza-
tion scheme applicable to certain classes of "habitual criminals" (such
as thieves) and not others (such as embezzlers). Justice William Doug-
las's opinion for the Court defended a more skeptical judicial scrutiny
of sterilization legislation on the ground that it involves "one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race."38 The person sterilized "is
forever deprived of a basic liberty."39 Although invoking the Equal
Protection Clause, Skinner reflected a broader principle also found in
Supreme Court due process decisions protecting against undifferenti-
ated state invasions of rights that are "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."4° Most of the due process, ordered-liberty decisions
involved the physical freedom implicated in search-and-seizure and
32. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-21 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 391 (1923); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378, 486-87 (N.Y. 1856) (leading case). The history is discussed in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721-36 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
33. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
34. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
35. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For background, see Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2
CONST. COMMENTARY 331 (1985).
36. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW 1-55 (1997) (privacy cases); id. at 136-202 (discourse of sexuality and American law).
37. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
38. Id. at 541.
39. Id.
40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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other criminal procedure cases, but Margaret Sanger and her allies in
the planned parenthood movement insisted that ordered liberty also
included the obverse of Skinner: the right to engage in sex without
fear of pregnancy.41
The Supreme Court twice, on procedural grounds, dismissed
planned parenthood lawsuits against Connecticut's 1879 law criminal-
izing the sale or use of contraceptives.42 In the second challenge, Poe
v. Ullman, dissenting Justice John Harlan reached the merits and ar-
gued that Connecticut's ban violated the Due Process Clause. Synthe-
sizing a century of case law, he stated that the Due Process Clause
protects rights "'which are .. fundamental; which belong ... to the
citizens of all free governments,"' 43 for "'the purposes [of securing]
which men enter into society.'"" Citing Skinner, Harlan argued that
the privacy involved in lovemaking by a married couple in their home
involves the most fundamental aspect of "liberty" and requires strict
scrutiny.45 Harlan immediately qualified his argument: "The right of
privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest
that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced."46
The Supreme Court finally reached the merits of Connecticut's
anticontraception law in Griswold v. Connecticut47 and struck it down
as inconsistent with a right of privacy Justice Douglas cobbled to-
gether from the penumbras of rights declared in the Bill of Rights.
Griswold not only confirmed Skinner's suggestion that an individual
has a fundamental liberty interest in sexual activity, but expanded
upon that idea. Whereas Skinner emphasized the traditional goal of
procreation when it protected against state sterilization, Griswold nec-
essarily delinked constitutional protection of private sexuality from
procreation. Whereas Skinner struck down a eugenics-based statute
that was a relative innovation in American law, Griswold struck down
an anticontraception law that dated from 1879 and that had been pre-
ceded by anticontraception laws at the national, state, and local
levels.48 Not only had Americans not "traditionally" enjoyed free ac-
cess to contraceptives, but the Due Process Clause was adopted (in
41. For discussions of Sanger's crusade, see ELLEN CHESSLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MAR-
GARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT ItN AMERICA (1992); ESKRIDGE &
HUNTER, supra note 36, at 3-19.
42. See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam); Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961).
43. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).
44. Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798)).
45. See id. at 548.
46. Id. at 553.
47. 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
48. On the background to anticontraception laws, see HEYWOOD BROtN & MARGARET
LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK 128-44 (1927); CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CON-
DUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA (1985).
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1868) against the backdrop of increasing national consensus favoring
laws criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives. Hence, Griswold
was a dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause, which not
only protected citizens' general liberty interests but also "incorpo-
rated" many of the Bill of Rights and their penumbras and made them
applicable against the states.
In other ways, however, Griswold embodied a traditionalist un-
derstanding of the right of sexual privacy. As the plaintiffs in that case
were married, Douglas's opinion for the Court emphasized the marital
features of the new right of privacy, the "bilateral loyalty" and inti-
macy involved in marriage.49 Fully agreeing with but going beyond
Douglas's emphasis on marital privacy, concurring Justices distanced
the right to marital privacy from adultery and homosexuality, two foci
of arguably legitimate state regulation. 0 Notwithstanding the tradi-
tionalist grounding of these opinions, the Court expanded Griswold
beyond marital sexuality after Harlan's departure from the Court. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,51 a closely divided Court struck down a statute
preventing unmarried couples from obtaining contraceptives. Justice
William Brennan's opinion for the Court emphasized the right of "the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.""2 The individual's right
to sexual privacy was dramatically underscored when the Court, in
Roe v. Wade,53 held that an unmarried woman has a fundamental due
process liberty interest in the decision whether to bear a child or to
obtain an abortion.
In 1977, Justice Brennan stated that "Griswold may no longer be
read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple's
use of contraceptives," and generally protected "individual autonomy
in matters of childbearing." 54 How far beyond "matters of child bear-
ing" did the right of sexual privacy extend? This question remained
unanswered in the 1970s. Potentially relevant was Stanley v. Geor-
gia," which had overturned Stanley's conviction for possessing ob-
scene materials in his home. Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for
the Court rested upon First Amendment protection for the dissemina-
tion of ideas, Griswold's right of sexual privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment "'right to be let alone"' to one's own "'thoughts ...
emotions and ...sensations,"' at least in the "privacy of his own
49. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
50. See id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). See generally DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY
AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF Roe v. Wade 79-195 (1994).
51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52. Id. at 453.
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (plurality opinion).
55. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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home."56 Justice Marshall essentially suggested that masturbatory fan-
tasies, with pictorial aids, were beyond state interference, especially
when they occurred at home. Also potentially relevant was the
Court's decision in Moore v. East Cleveland,57 which struck down a
municipal bar to household cohabitation of loosely related or unre-
lated persons.
Although the Burger Court repeatedly declined to invalidate
state sodomy laws throughout the 1970s,58 it did not write a full-scale
decision addressing the privacy issues. Commentators of various ideol-
ogies read the foregoing precedents to create broad constitutional
protection for personal freedom in matters of sexual behavior be-
tween consenting adults,5 9 and state judges began to follow suit. In
People v. Onofre,6 ° the New York Court of Appeals invalidated the
state law prohibiting consensual sodomy on federal privacy grounds.
The court read Eisenstadt and Stanley to require that Griswold's right
of privacy be extended to prevent "government interference with the
practice of personal choice in matters of intimate sexual behavior out
of view of the public and with no commercial component."'"
What were the limits of the sexual privacy right in 1982, when
Michael Hardwick challenged Georgia's sodomy law? Consider the
following array of sexual activities:
(1) Procreative marital intercourse (implicit in Skinner; nine-
teenth-century cases) ;62
(2) Nonprocreative contraceptive marital intercourse
(Griswold);
(3) Nonprocreative contraceptive nonmarital intercourse
(Eisenstadt);
(4) Masturbation in one's bedroom (implicit in Stanley);
(5) Abortion (Roe);
(6) Nonnuclear family living arrangements (Moore);
(7) Intercourse in a secluded automobile (Onofre);
(8) Adultery (not necessarily protected, Poe dissent);
(9) Incest (two adults) (same);
56. Id. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
57. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977). The plurality opinion by Justice Powell rested upon privacy
concerns. See id. at 499. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the basis of a takings
analysis. See id. at 521.
58. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (per curiam);
Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
59. See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
Sup. CT. REV. 173, 198; Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 296 (1973); see also Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1971) (criticizing the
whole line of privacy decisions, precisely because they generally protect "sexual gratification[ ]"
without any generating or limiting constitutional principle).
60. 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980).
61. Id. at 941.
62. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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(10) Commercial sex (not protected, Onofre);
(11) Intergenerational sex (not protected, implicit in Onofre);
(12) Forcible sex (same).
Where did consensual oral sex between two adult men within the
home-the conduct for which Hardwick was charged-fit? Was it like
the protected activities in categories (3)-(4), as Onofre held, or more
akin to the unprotected activities in categories (8)-(9), as Justice
Harlan said in his Poe dissent?
To answer this question, one needs to determine what principle
undergirds the cases. One principle that explains the case law array is
the Millian idea that the state should leave people alone unless their
conduct has third-party effects unrelated to "nosy preferences" (my
preference to make you just like me).6 3 Under that principle, Hard-
wick's behavior falls closest to categories (3) and (4), well within the
core area protected by the right to privacy. Category (5), abortion, is
potentially less entitled to protection than private, consensual sod-
omy, because there are more third-party interests usually involved:
not just the interest of the fetus (or the state's interest in "potential
life"), but also the interests of the putative father and grandparents. In
Poe and Griswold, Justice Harlan indicated that adultery, "homosexu-
ality," fornication, and incest might be outside the right to privacy,'
but his views (dicta in a dissenting opinion) never commanded a ma-
jority of the Court. Under the libertarian principle, adultery (category
(8)) and incest (category (9)) might be regulated because of their
third-party effects: disruption of the family, violation of marriage vows
(adultery), predation against vulnerable minors (the typical incest
prosecution). Private sexual intimacy between consenting adults,
whether it be fornication or sodomy, could fall within the right of pri-
vacy as conceived in the post-Griswold cases. In short, Hardwick's ac-
tivity, at first glance, fits within the core libertarian features of the
Court's privacy precedents. The Model Penal Code and Onofre fol-
lowed that principle, as did the court of appeals in Hardwick's case.65
Other principles might be invoked to explain the Court's array of
privacy precedents. Botsford,6 6 a leading nineteenth-century case, sug-
gests an anticommandeering reading of privacy: the state cannot com-
mandeer our bodies for its rather than our uses, absent a compelling
public-regarding reason. Griswold and Moore extend this idea to our
relationships. This approach would defend Griswold (categories (2)
63. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 88-110
(McMillan 1926) (1859); see also POSNER, supra note 14 (discussing pragmatic application of a
weak version of Mill to issues of sexual liberty).
64. See supra notes 46, 50 and accompanying text
65. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1980); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5
and commentary at 277-78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND MORALITY 15 (1963) (discussing 1955 draft of Model Penal Code and commentary at page
277).
66. Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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and (3)) and Roe (category (5)) on the ground that the state has no
sufficient reason to justify regulations that impose conditions (preg-
nancy) upon women's bodies and total identities (motherhood) upon
women's lives.67 As Jed Rubenfeld argues, such a principle fully ap-
plies to Hardwick's case as well, for the state's regulation of "homo-
sexual sodomy" channels certain individuals into a network of social
roles that will occupy, even dominate, their lives to a substantial
degree.68
Adopting a narrower principle to explain the precedents, the
Court in Hardwick held that the right of sexual privacy, a right not
explicitly listed in the Constitution, should not be extended beyond
the "fundamental individual right to decide whether or not to beget or
bear a child" (categories (1)-(3), (5)).69 This was a more presentable
reading of the precedents in 1965 than in 1986, however.70 One prob-
lem is that the Court had already extended the right of sexual privacy
beyond this limit in Stanley (category (4)). Hardwick dismissed Stan-
ley as an inapplicable First Amendment decision, 71 but Stanley relied
explicitly on privacy grounds and relied on no other precedents but
Griswold and Fourth Amendment (privacy) cases.72 Nor does the
characterization account for the cases in which the Court struck down
laws prohibiting cohabitation of people of different races and of peo-
ple not belonging to a nuclear family (category (6)). 7 3 Finally, to the
extent that Hardwick rested upon denying constitutional protections
to "homosexuals" that would be accorded "heterosexuals," its incon-
sistency with Evans is exacerbated. The Court's apparent response to
these difficulties would be that "homosexual sodomy" is more like
adultery and incest (categories (8) and (9)) than contraception (cate-
gories (2) and (3)) for this reason: Like adultery and incest, "homo-
sexual sodomy" has traditionally been stigmatized and regulated, and
not left as a matter of individual liberty in Anglo-American law.74 The
Court's response, and ultimately the entire opinion, rested upon a
principle of regulatory history more than a principle of constitutional
logic or policy.
As Justice White told the story, proscriptions against "homosex-
ual sodomy" have "ancient roots" whose viability has only slightly di-
67. See Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 788-91.
68. See id. at 799-802.
69. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
70. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
71. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
72. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
73. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down an ordinance
limiting occupancy to "related" persons; plurality opinion relies on privacy right); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating law banning different-race couples from cohabiting;
majority opinion relies on race discrimination rationale but also emphasizes disruption of cohab-
itants' privacy).
74. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191-95.
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minished. According to Justice White, what Michael Hardwick did-
oral sex-was an offense at common law and in all thirteen states at
the founding, was illegal in thirty-two of the thirty-seven states when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified (1868), was illegal in all fifty
states until 1961, and remained criminal in twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia as of 1986.75 Given this pervasive history of state
concern, Justice White concluded that it was, "at best, facetious" for
Hardwick to claim that the nation's history and tradition supported
his right to engage in such conduct.76 An initial problem with applying
a principle of history to determine the scope of a constitutional right
of privacy is that such a methodology would seem to require a differ-
ent result in Roe v. Wade, which overturned an abortion prohibition
widely accepted in the Reconstruction era. When the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868, thirty-six state or territorial laws
limited abortion 77-not so different from the thirty-two states having
sodomy laws at that time (the factual basis for Hardwick's holding).
The one historical distinction between Roe and Hardwick is that abor-
tion before quickening was not regulated at common law,78 while sod-
omy was. This strikes me as a weak basis for distinguishing Roe from
Hardwick, however, and the weakness of the distinction is under-
scored by the actual history of sodomy regulation in the United States.
II. A MORE AccuRATE HISTORY OF SODOMY LAWS
Because Justice White's opinion in Hardwick rested ultimately
upon historical analysis, the opinion may be tested against historical
materials and theories. Anne Goldstein initiated the criticism that
Hardwick relied on a flawed historical account of sodomy laws.79 This
article is a continuation of the project she began. Ironically, a historio-
graphically sophisticated understanding of the "original understand-
ing" of sodomy at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment undermines Justice White's equation of sodomy with
oral sex, consensual intercourse, or homosexuality. To understand just
how problematic Justice White's history was, requires a retelling of
the history from a perspective that is more fact based and better in-
formed by the enormous historiographical literature.
A. Sodomy Law Before the Homosexual, 1533-1880
At the behest of Henry VIII, the Reformation Parliament of 1533
temporarily criminalized "the detestable and abominable vice of bug-
75. See id. at 192-94 & nn.5-7.
76. Id. at 194.
77. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 174-77 & n.1 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 134-40.
79. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 1081-86 & nn.60-72.
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gery committed with mankind or beast."' 0 Elizabeth I's second Parlia-
ment reenacted the Act of 1533, including its penalty of death for
buggery.81 These statutes secularized offenses that had traditionally
been called "sodomy" and had been regulated by the Roman Catholic
Church, which Henry and Elizabeth were renouncing. As applied by
the English courts, buggery was understood to include anal inter-
course between two men 82 or between a man and a woman83 ("sod-
omy"), any sexual intercourse between a human male or female and
an animal8" ("bestiality"), but not oral intercourse between humans
8 5
(neither sodomy nor bestiality, nor any other species of buggery). Sex-
ual intercourse between women was not regulated by the Act of 1533.
The English criminal prohibition of buggery and its punishment
as a capital crime were generally applicable in the American colo-
nies-either as a matter of common law or by statutory enactment.86
For example, although Virginia did not formally have a buggery law in
place, the colony in 1624-25 tried and executed Richard Cornish, a
ship's master, for attacking and sodomizing a steward.87 Explicitly in-
voking biblical injunctions, the New England colonies alone consid-
ered expanding the coverage of the Act of 1533. The Massachusetts
Bay Colony debated but ultimately declined to adopt Reverend John
Cotton's 1636 proposal that woman-woman intercourse be included as
80. 25 Hen. 8 ch. 6 (1533) (Eng.). This law was one of the first moves in Henry VIII's
campaign to separate England from the Roman Catholic Church.
81. The Act of 1533 was only temporary, enduring until "the last Day of the next Parlia-
ment." It was renewed, again temporarily, in 1536 and 1539 and was made perpetual in 1540,
near the end of Henry's reign. The law was modified by Edward VI's Parliament in 1548 but
repealed when Queen Mary in 1553 abolished all felonies created since the reign of her father,
Henry VIII. Elizabeth's second Parliament reenacted the original Act of 1533, upon a finding
that "divers evil disposed persons have been more bold to commit the said most horrible and
detestable vice of buggery aforesaid." 5 Eliz. ch. 17 (1562) (Eng.). See generally Francois Lafitte,
Homosexuality and the Law, 9 BRIT. J. DELINQ. 8 (July 1958).
82. See Rex v. Corone, 77 Eng. Rep. 1318 (K.B. 1607) (citing Stafford's case).
83. See Rex v. Wiseman, 92 Eng. Rep. 774, 775 (K.B. 1716) (interpreting "mankind" in Act
of 1533 to include women and girls).
84. See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 58-59 (1644).
85. See Rex v. Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B. 1817) (forcible fellatio by man upon unwill-
ing boy was not within buggery statute).
86. See infra Appendix references for Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Virginia. On colonial regulation of sodomy, see generally Caroline Bing-
ham, Seventeenth-Century Attitudes Toward Deviant Sex, 1 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 447 (1971); Louis
Crompton, Homosexuals and the Death Penalty in Colonial America, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALI=Y 277
(1976); Robert Oaks, 'Things Fearful to Name: Sodomy and Buggery in Seventeenth-Century
New England, 12 J. Soc. HIST. 268 (1978); Robert Oaks, Perceptions of Homosexuality by Jus-
tices of the Peace in Colonial Virginia, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW, at 35 (Donald C.
Knutson ed., 1980). Critical primary documents are reproduced in JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY/
LESBIAN ALMANAC: A NEW DOCUMENTARY 66-133 (1993) [hereinafter KATZ, ALMANAC] and
JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 11-24 (rev. ed. 1992) [hereinafter KATZ,
AMERICAN HISTORY].
87. See KATZ, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 69-70; KA'rZ, AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note
86, at 16-19. The English buggery statute was implicitly recognized as in force. See KATZ, ALMA-
NAC, supra note 86, at 68.
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sodomy."8 The New Haven Colony in 1656 prohibited under pain of
death men lying with men, women lying with women, masturbation (if
aggravating circumstances), and any other "carnall knowledge."89
Masturbation and women lying with women were dropped as offenses
when the New Haven Colony was annexed by Connecticut in 1665.90
On the other hand, the authorities in Connecticut and Massachusetts,
like those in Virginia, were willing to prosecute men and on at least
one occasion women for same-sex lewdness without a specific statu-
tory basis.9 Altogether, there are records for perhaps as many as
twenty sodomy prosecutions and four executions during the colonial
period.9 z
Between independence and 1830, the original thirteen states all
adopted laws making buggery or sodomy a serious offense, but most
eliminated the death penalty. 93 None of the early statutes defined
what precisely was meant by buggery or sodomy, for this remained "a
detestable and abominable sin, amongst Christians not to be named,"
as Sir Edward Coke put it in 1644. 94 New states adopted similar laws,
usually deploying terminology such as "sodomy, or the crime against
nature, with mankind or beast."95 Most of the early statutes were re-
vised by the middle of the century to criminalize what Coke and
Blackstone had termed "the infamous crime against nature."96
(Again, note the shift in terminology.) Courts and commentators in
the nineteenth century read the sodomy, buggery, carnal knowledge,
and crime against nature statutes-hereinafter collectively described
simply as sodomy laws-to criminalize "unnatural" intercourse be-
tween men and women as well as men and men, but not between wo-
88. See KATZ, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 74, 76-78.
89. J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, THE TRUE-BLUE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT AND NEW HAVEN
201 (1879), excerpted in KATZ, AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 86, at 23.
90. See KATZ, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 85, 94, 102.
91. See, e.g., id. at 75 (Plymouth, 1637; two men prosecuted for "lewd behavior"); id. at 85-
86 (Massachusetts Bay, 1642; women prosecuted for "unseemly practices"); id. at 100 (New Ha-
ven, 1683; youths prosecuted for "wickedness" with one another).
92. See id. at 29, 58, 663, nn.7-8. There may have been fewer than 20 prosecutions for
sodomy, as some of the prosecutions listed in Katz were for public lewdness.
93. See infra Appendix references for Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Virginia. According to KATZ, ALMANAC, supra note 86, Pennsylvania elimi-
nated the death penalty for sodomy or buggery in 1786, id. at 130, followed by New Jersey and
New York in 1796, id. at 121, 125; Rhode Island in 1798, id. at 105; Virginia in 1800, id. at 104;
Massachusetts in 1805, id. at 122; New Hampshire in 1812, id. at 131; Connecticut in 1821, id. at
677 n.40; Delaware in 1826, id. at 131; North Carolina in 1869, id. at 104; and South Carolina in
1873, id. at 128.
94. CoKE, supra note 84, at 58-59.
95. See, e.g., Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 139, § 15 (1849); see also ILL. REV. CODE, CRIM. CODE
§ 50 (1827).
96. CoKE, supra note 84, at 58-59; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215 (1765).
Examples of such midcentury revisions can be found in DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 20, ch. 131, § 7
(1852); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 165, § 18 (1860); N.C. REV. CODE, ch. 34, § 6 (1854).
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men and women.97 Although there were only a handful of reported
cases (discussed below), sodomy prosecutions occurred episodically
throughout the century.
That there was a complex regulatory philosophy underlying An-
glo-American sodomy laws is illustrated by one of the earliest Ameri-
can cases, the prosecution of William Plaine of Guilford, in the New
Haven Colony. He was prosecuted and executed in 1646 (before New
Haven's sodomy statute of 1655) for "unclean practices." Governor
John Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay described the case:
[B]eing a married man, he had committed sodomy with two per-
sons in England, and . .. he had corrupted a great part of the
youth of Guilford by masturbations, which he had committed,
and provoked others to the like above a hundred times; and to
some who questioned the lawfulness of such filthy practice, he did
insinuate seeds of atheism, questioning whether there was a God,
etc. The magistrates and elders (so many as were at hand) did all
agree that he ought to die, and gave divers reasons from the word
of God. And indeed it was horrendum facinus [a dreadful crime],
and he a monster in human shape, exceeding all human rules and
examples that ever had been heard of, and it tended to the frus-
trating of the ordinance of marriage and the hindering of the gen-
eration of mankind.98
Three distinct regulatory agendas can be discerned in this account;
each is independently supported by other historical evidence.
1. Fostering Procreative Sex Within Marriage
The primary historical justification for penalizing crimes against
nature reaches back to the early Christian era and the Middle Ages.99
Following the lead of Saint Paul, early church fathers synthesized
ideas from Christianity's Jewish heritage and Roman context to create
a regime whereby sex and pleasures of the body were considered pre-
sumptively suspect-morally valuable only when engaged in for pro-
creative purposes within marriage. The Church's synthesis played a
critical role in the systematic natural law philosophy developed in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries by Gratian, Albertus Magnus, and
Thomas Aquinas. Under Roman Catholic natural law, fornication,
97. See 2 JOEL PREr'mss BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 1028, at 731
(2d ed. 1859); 2 JOSEPH CHrITY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW *47-50 (5th Am. ed.
1847); ROBERT DESTY, A COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 143 (1882); JOHN WIL-
DER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES § 210, at 223 (1881).
98. JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649, at 324 (James Sav-
age ed., 1853), reprinted in KA-z, AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 86, at 22.
99. The account that follows is taken from BERNADETTE J. BROOTEN, LOVE BETWEEN
WOMEN: EARLY CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO FEMALE HOMOEROTICISM (1996), as well as PETER
BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN EARLY
CHRISTIANTY (1988); MICHAEL GOODIcH, THE UNMENTIONABLE VICE: HOMOSEXUALITY IN
THE LATER MEDIEVAL PERIOD (1979).
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adultery, and same-sex sodomy were sins because they were pleasures
of the body that by definition occurred outside the context of mar-
riage; contraception and perhaps abortion, masturbation, and all kinds
of sodomy were sins because they were by definition nonprocreative.
In this way, same-sex sodomy under a natural law understanding was
doubly sinful-the pursuit of bodily pleasure without the redemption
of procreative marriage.
Winthrop's account of the Plaine case illustrates the importance
of these natural law goals for Protestant theology, notwithstanding its
other departures from Catholic theology. In America as in England,
bodily pleasure was viewed as a corruption-guilty until proven inno-
cent. Thus, marriage was the norm, and procreation within marriage
remained critically important for those largely rural societies with high
infant mortality rates. For religious fundamentalists like the New Eng-
land Puritans, the presumptive sinfulness of bodily pleasure-unre-
deemed by marriage and procreation-was the overwhelming reason
for punishing sodomy. 100 This rationale retained much force in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When American states systemat-
ically codified their criminal laws in the middle and late nineteenth
century, most of them included sodomy prohibitions in the same title
or chapter as, and in close proximity with, adultery, fornication, blas-
phemy, and incest (typically termed "crimes against public morals and
decency").'
2. Protection of Vulnerable People Against Nonconsensual Sexual
Assault
A second theme of Winthrop's account of the Plaine case was the
way in which a potent aggressor allegedly victimized the local
"youth." I read this reference to be a concern for the sexual and bod-
ily integrity of more vulnerable citizens at the hands of an aggressive
man. Sodomy in this reading was akin to sexual assault without mean-
ingful consent and thereby was linked with rape (nonconsensual pe-
nile-vaginal sex with a woman) and seduction (penile-vaginal sex with
a girl under the age of consent). This regulatory policy was best illus-
trated by the infamous 1631 conviction and execution in England of
Lord Castlehaven for abetting a rape upon his wife, sodomizing his
servants, and countenancing the debauching of his daughter. 02
The policy against sexual predation is also illustrated by the legal
context of sodomy laws in the United States. Several of the early state
100. See, e.g., the New England antisodomy materials collected in KATZ, ALMANAC, supra
note 86, at 78-84, 86-87, 94-100.
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 3230-3257 (1852); HAw. PENAL CODE ch. 13 (1850); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 30 (1845); MASS. GEN. STAT. pt. IV, tit. 1, ch. 165 (1860); MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 158,
§§ 1-30 (1846); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 5, §§ 8-20 (1881).
102. See THE TRYAL AND CONDEMNATION OF MERVIN, LORD AUDLEY EARL OF CASTLE-
HAVEN (1699), reprinted in SODOMY TRIALS 11-39 (Randolph Trumbach ed., 1986).
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criminal codes listed sodomy with other crimes of assault, typically
adjacent to rape. °3 Although sodomy later in the century came to be
linked more strongly with moral crimes, the structure of sodomy pros-
ecutions remained formally tied to the structure of rape prosecutions.
When adults engaged in consensual sodomy, each was the accomplice
of the other. In cases of both rape and sodomy, the states required
independent corroboration of the accomplice's testimony that the
crime had occurred (including penetration by the male sex organ).
1°4
American courts bent that rule in cases where sexual penetration was
perpetrated by force (like rape) or against a minor (like seduction);
such victims were in most states not accomplices as a matter of law,
and so their testimony standing alone could convict of sodomy, or
rape, or seduction.1°5 The practical consequence of the accomplice-
corroboration rule in sodomy cases was that prosecutions were much
more difficult-if not usually impossible-in situations of consensual
adult sex. Almost all of the reported sodomy cases in the nineteenth
century involved allegations that a man was assaulting a less powerful
man, woman, ward, child, or animal.1"6
3. Social Enforcement of Gender Roles
A third policy served by sodomy laws was to demonize particular
persons or dangerous groups. Winthrop's description of Plaine as a
"monster" and his not-at-all gratuitous accusation that Plaine was
planting seeds of atheism were typical of his era. Accusations of sod-
omy were regularly accompanied by charges of heresy and devilry
103. See Act of Dec. 17, 1838, § 4, 1838 Ark. Acts 121, 122 (sodomy linked with carnal
abuses of female children); GA. PENAL CODE fifth div., §§ 29-38 (1816) (maiming, rape, sodomy,
assault listed together); Act of Dec. 21, 1864, ch. 3, §§ 44-47, 1866 Idaho Laws 298, 305-06 (carnal
knowledge of female child, sodomy, assault, and rape listed together); ILL. CRIMINAL CODE
§§ 47-52 (1839) (same); NEV. Comp. LAws ch. LV, §§ 2350-2352 (1873) (rape, crime against na-
ture, assault listed together); Act of Mar. 21, 1801, ch. 58, 1801 N.Y. Laws 97 (rape, crime against
nature, burglary, robbery listed together).
104. See FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 443
(2d ed. 1852).
105. See 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 512 (8th ed. 1880).
106. See Hodges v. State, 19 S.E. 758 (Ga. 1894) (defendant charged with molesting a boy
under 14 years of age); Collins v. State, 73 Ga. 76 (1884) (defendant charged with bestiality);
Honselman v. People, 48 N.E. 304 (I11. 1897) (defendant police officer charged with oral sex with
a 14-year-old boy); Davis v. State, 3 H. & J. 154, 154 (Md. 1810) (defendant allegedly "with force
and arms ... did make an assault ... beat, wound, and illtreat" a 19-year-old "youth"); Com-
monwealth v. Snow, 111 Mass. 411 (1873) (defendant charged with seducing a "boy"); State v.
Frank, 15 S.W. 330 (Mo. 1891) (defendant charged with intercourse with dog); Territory v. Ma-
haffey, 3 Mont. 112 (1878) (defendant charged with seducing a 14-year-old boy); Foster v. State,
1 Ohio Cir. Dec. 467 (Ohio Cir. 1886) (three defendants charged with gang raping a fourth man);
Prindle v. State, 21 S.W. 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (defendant charged with having oral sex
with a child); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 4 Va. 307 (1812) (defendant charged with having sex
with a mare). I read all the nineteenth-century sodomy cases reported in either the West Report-
ing System or the state reports; the foregoing cases are representative of the larger corpus of
cases where the court describes the conduct and parties; see also 2 CHrrr, supra note 97, at *48-
50 (all the "model" buggery or sodomy indictments reprinted by Chitty involved allegations of
predation by an older man against a minor boy or girl).
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during the Church's enforcement of sodomy rules in the Middle Ages
and the state's enforcement in the early modern period. In eighteenth-
century England and France, however, the sodomite came to be seen
as a monster of a different sort-a feminized man. °7 If the greatest
social crime in the Middle Ages (and Puritan New England) was reli-
gious heresy, the social crime of the nascent modern era was a failure
to live up to the bourgeois conceptions of chastity and manhood. °8
In the United States, the conceptualization of sodomy along lines
of gender role was at best rudimentary until after the Civil War.'0 9
And, even then, sodomy enforcement was not limited to gender role
maintenance, for the application of sodomy laws was also strongly
slanted along lines of race, ethnicity, and class. The U.S. Census Bu-
reau reported in 1880 that sixty-three prisoners were then incarcer-
ated for crimes against nature.1'0 A majority (thirty-two) of the
prisoners were males of color in the South. A third of the white pris-
oners were foreign (European) born.
B. New Specifications of the Crime Against Nature and the
Discourse of Degeneracy, 1880-1920
The 1880s were a boom time for crimes against nature. Where the
1880 Census had identified sixty-three prisoners for this crime, the
1890 Census identified 224,1" a four-fold increase concentrated in the
big-city states of the North, especially New York, Baltimore, San
Francisco, Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia." 2 Arrests continued
their upward trajectory in these cities after 1890, and World War I set
new sodomy records, as it thrust thousands of men into homosocial
settings in this country as well as abroad." 3 Notwithstanding these
new highs, sodomy arrests remained a tiny portion (less than one per-
107. See Michel Rey, Parisian Homosexuals Create a Lifestyle 1700-1750: The Police
Archives, in 'Tis NATURE'S FAULT: UNAUTHORIZED SEXUALITY DURING THE ENLIGHTENMENT
179, 179-91 (Robert Purks Maccubbin ed., Robert A. Day & Robert Welch trans., 1987); Ran-
dolf Trumbach, Sodomitical Subcultures, Sodomitical Roles, and the Gender Revolution of the
Eighteenth Century: The Recent Historiography, in 'Tis NATURE'S FAULT: UNAUTHORIZED SEX-
UALITY DURING THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra, at 109, 109-21. For an additional argument that
Christian animus to female-female relations reflected an ideology of rigid gender roles, see gen-
erally BROOTEN, supra note 99.
108. For the cumulative nature of these abominations, see the indictments reported in 2
CH1=rr, supra note 97, at *48-50.
109. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regula-
tion of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1011-32 (1997).
110. See FREDERICK H. WINES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, REPORT ON
THE DEFECTIVE, DEPENDENT, AND DELINQUENT CLASSES OF THE.POPULATION OF THE UNITED
STATES, AS RETURNED AT THE TENTH CENSUS (1880), excerpted in KATZ, AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra note 86, at 37.
111. See FREDERICK H. WINES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, REPORT ON
CRIME, PAUPERISM, AND BENEVOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS:
1890, pt.I, at 18-20 (1896), excerpted in KATZ, AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 86, at 39.
112. See Eskridge, supra note 109, at 1110-11 app. 1 (listing sodomy arrest figures for nine
American cities from 1880-1940).
113. See id.
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cent) of total arrests in all cities." 4 These figures probably reflect an
increase in nonconforming sexual activity, but they also reflect a
heightened middle-class and state concern for citizens who threatened
not only traditional views about marriage and sex, but also entrenched
gender roles. Sodomy laws played a role in policing these so-called
"degenerates" and were stretched and revised by the police, judges,
and legislators.
1. Urban Perversions (Prostitutes, Passing Women, Fairies)
The feminist and gay historiographical literature suggests con-
vincing reasons for heightened awareness of nonmarital sex generally
and same-sex intimacy in particular." 5 The reasons start with
America's urbanization, which accompanied its post-Civil War indus-
trialization. Urbanization was important, in part because it concen-
trated in one place large numbers of people with heterogeneous
sexual tastes and afforded them many opportunities for satisfying
those tastes. This is what happened in America's cities after the Civil
War. The main phenomenon, eclipsing all others, was the expansion of
prostitution: the streetwalker was supplemented by the bawdy house,
where groups of female sex workers could live together and ply their
trade to willing customers. The expansion of prostitution was met with
an even more pronounced "purity movement" against it. 1 6 A related
phenomenon involved people who "inverted" gender, namely, cross-
dressing women who appropriated male sexual and economic roles,
and "fairies" or female impersonators who dressed as women and ac-
cepted the passive role in sexual intercourse with other men.
117
Americans had seen cross-dressing men and women before the
Civil War. What was new and disturbing in the post-Civil War period
was, first, the greater incidence of known and even public cross-gen-
der behavior; second, the formation of communities of gender inverts;
and, third, a stronger association of inverted gender roles and inverted
sexual tastes. In 1871, a sexual advice manual for men said that "every
unnatural lust recorded in the mordant satires of Juvenal, the cynical
epigrams of Martial, or the licentious stories of Petronius, is practised,
not in rare or exceptional cases, but deliberately and habitually in the
114. See id. at 1017.
115. What follows draws liberally from GEORGE CHAUNCEY, JR., GAY NEW YORK: GEN-
DER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994); E.
ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD: TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE
REVOLUTIONARY TO THE MODERN ERA (1993); SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 48; Allan B6r-
ubd, Lesbians and Gay Men in Early San Francisco: Notes Toward a Social History of Lesbians
and Gay Men in America (Mar. 27, 1979) (unpublished manuscript for San Francisco Gay His-
tory Project, on file with author).
116. See generally THOMAS C. MACKEY, RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTI-
TUTION, DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE DISTRICTS, 1870-1917 (1987); DAVID J. PIVAR, PURITY
CRUSADE: SEXUAL MORALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 1868-1900 (1973); RUTH ROSEN, THE
LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA, 1900-1918 (1982).
117. See ROSEN, supra note 116, at 84-85; ROTUNDO, supra note 115, at 262-79.
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great cities of our country.""n 8 The author described "restaurants fre-
quented by men in women's attire, yielding themselves to indescrib-
able lewdness," as well as "literature so inconceivably devilish as to
advocate and extoll this utter depravity."" 9 Dr. Frank Lydston in 1889
lectured the Chicago College of Physicians and Surgeons on the ex-
tensive "colony of male sexual perverts" in that city, and indeed in
"every community of any size."' 2 ° According to the doctor, "they op-
erate in accordance with some definite and concerted plan in quest of
subjects wherewith to gratify their abnormal sexual impulses. Often
they are characterized by effeminacy of voice, dress, and manner. "121
In contrast to men, "women usually fall into perverted sexual habits
for the purpose of pandering to the depraved tastes of their patrons
rather than from instinctive impulses."'12 2 He was referring to prosti-
tutes, although he recounted one example of a "woman of perfect
physique, who is not a professional prostitute.., who has a fondness
for women.', 123 The most notable phenomenon, Dr. Lydston noted,
was the proliferation of bawdy houses "whose principal business is to
cater to the perverted sexual tastes of a numerous class of patrons, "124
probably including oral sex that their wives would not provide at
home. Communities of gender-benders were prominent and alarming
to the denizens of Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, San
Francisco, and other large American cities. 25
2. The New Discourse of Inversion and Degeneracy
At the same time the nation was becoming mildly alarmed by the
increasing visibility of people violating established gender norms, a
new secularized vocabulary was being developed to understand these
people. 126 Rather than criticizing prostitutes and sodomites for unnat-
ural conduct that violated a natural law or religious ideal, as John
118. GEORGE H. NAPHEYS, THE TRANSMISSION OF LIFE: COUNSELS ON THE NATURE AND
HYGIENE OF THE MASCULINE FUNCTION 29 (1880).
119. Id.
120. G. Frank Lydston, Clinical Lecture: Sexual Perversion, Satyriasis and Nymphomania, 61




124. Id. at 256, excerpted in KATz, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 214.
125. See generally 2 HAVELOCK ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX: SEXUAL IN-
VERSION 351-52 (3d ed. 1915). For particular cities, see CHAUNCEY, supra note 115 (New York);
THE HISTORY PROJECT, IMPROPER BOSTONIANS 38-141 (1998); and SUSAN STRYKER & JIM VAN
BUSKIRK, GAY BY THE BAY: A HISTORY OF QUEER CULTURE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY
AREA (1996).
126. The most educational account is NATHAN G. HALE, JR., FREUD AND THE AMERICANS:
THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1876-1917, ch. 4 (1971). Other
useful works include VERN L. BULLOUGH, SCIENCE IN THE BEDROOM (1994); LILLIAN
FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN (1981); George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual Inver-
sion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance, SAL-
MAGUNDi, Fall 1982-Winter 1983, at 114. Many primary sources are reproduced in KATZ,
ALMANAC, supra note 86.
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Winthrop had done in his description of the Plaine case above, the
new "sexologists" and their politically progressive allies criticized
prostitutes and androgynes for their gender status that represented a
degeneration (downward evolution) from normal gender identities
and threatened the health of a dynamic society. This emphasis on de-
generate status as opposed to unnatural conduct reflected a shift in
thinking about same-sex intimacy.
The most influential early sexologist was Richard von Krafft-Eb-
ing, whose Psychopathia Sexualis was first published in 1886 and up-
dated periodically. 127  He started with biologically gendered
assumptions about men's and women's different sexual instincts: Man
"has beyond doubt the stronger sexual appetite" and is "aggressive
and impetuous," while nurturing woman "remains passive" as the man
woos her.128 He posited a set of profound gender differences and
linked them to racial eugenics. "The higher the anthropological devel-
opment of the race, the stronger these contrasts between man and wo-
man, and vice versa.' 129 Krafft-Ebing's book took for granted that
normal healthy sex is penile-vaginal intercourse between a masculine
male and a feminine female and then systematically categorized an
array of deviations from this norm, all of them rooted in a congenital
defect in the deviant's brain or constitution. "Inversion" by women or
men revealing physical or psychological characteristics of the opposite
sex was for Krafft-Ebing a leading sexual pathology reflecting a
broader mental or physical "degeneration," or reversion to a prior ev-
olutionary status.
130
American doctors found Psychopathia Sexualis intellectually con-
genial with their own opinions about gender-bending women and
men. Reflecting the views of many colleagues who had done case
studies, Dr. George Beard wrote in 1884 that when one's sex is per-
verted, "they hate the opposite sex, and love their own; men become
women, and women men, in their tastes, conduct, character, feelings
and behavior."'' The Americans were most fascinated with Krafft-
127. Ernest van den Haag, Introduction to RICHARD VON KRAIFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA
SEXUALIS: A MEDICO-FORENSIC STUDY 7 (Harry E. Wedeck trans., G.P. Putnams Sons 1965)
(1892) [hereinafter KRA=~r-EBING]. Psychopathia Sexualis was translated and published in Eng-
lish in 1892.
128. Id. at 33.
129. Id. at 56.
130. See id. at 55. A kinder, gentler theory of inversion, more readily accessible to American
doctors, was ELLIS, supra note 125.
131. GEORGE M. BEARD, SEXUAL NEURASTHENIA: ITS HYGIENE, CAUSES, SYMPTOMS, AND
TREATMENT 106-07 (1884), excerpted in KATz, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 200. For other early
examples, see James G. Kiernan, Sexual Perversion and the Whitechapel Murders, 4 MED. STAN-
DARD 170 (1888), paraphrased in KATZ, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 208; Phillip Leidy &
Charles K. Mills, Reports of Cases of Insanity from the Insane Department of the Philadelphia
Hospital, 13 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 712 (1886); George F. Shrady, Perverted Sexual
Instinct, 26 MED. REC. 70 (1884); P.M. Wise, Case of Sexual Perversion, 4 ALIENIST & NEUROLO-
GIST 87 (1883) (case study of woman passing as a man who grabbed a female attendant in a
"lewd manner").
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Ebing's idea that any departure from strict binary gender roles
(man=masculine, woman=feminine) represented a degeneration to
more primitive forms. Lydston argued that all vice and crime could be
traced to "the degenerate classes," those "persons of low grade of de-
velopment, physically and mentally, with a defective understanding of
their true relations to the social system in which they live.... In them,
vice, crime, and disease go hand in hand."'13 2 Prostitutes (with inordi-
nate sexual desire) and sexual inverts (with inappropriate sex and gen-
der roles) were two of the chief degenerate classes, and they
contributed in urban areas to a dramatic surge in "perverted" sexual
practices.133 Lydston believed in evolutionary reversion, whereby the
prostitute and invert abandon the inhibitions of civilization and revert
to subhuman, animalistic desires. 34 More alarmingly, degeneracy was
thought to be a social disease that could be passed on to the next
generation, both through heritable characteristics and the bad exam-
ple set by degenerates to the young.135 Lydston and others of his era
proposed bans on marriage by degenerates, eugenic castration, and
sterilization as cures.
1 36
The Americans' explication and elaboration of Krafft-Ebing was
racist as well as moralist. In an 1892 article, Dr. Irving Rosse associ-
ated sexual perversions with prehistoric "troglodytes," barnyard ani-
mals, prostitutes, and people of color. 137 His main contemporary
example of perversion involved a "band of negro men" of "androgy-
nous character" whose "rites" of phallic worship were raided by the
Washington police; he also cited to arrests, mainly of blacks, in Lafay-
ette Park, a notorious cruising ground in the shadow of the White
House. 138 Lydston's book on social disease devoted an entire chapter
to the so-called degenerated practices of racial minorities and primi-
tive cultures. "Physical and moral degeneracy-the latter involving
chiefly the higher and more frequently acquired attributes-with a
distinct tendency to reversion of type, is evident in the Southern ne-
gro. This physical and moral degeneracy and atavism is especially
manifest in the direction of sexual proclivities," Lydston wrote.
139
"The removal by his liberation of certain inhibitions placed upon the
negro by slavery itself ... has been especially effective as a causal
factor of sexual crimes among the blacks of the South."' 4 °
132. G. FRANK LYDSTON, THE DISEASES OF SOCIETY (THE VICE AND CRIME PROBLEM) 37
(1904).
133. See id. at 308-09, 372-73.
134. See id. at 90.
135. See id. at 68-70.
136. See id. at 420-21.
137. See Irving C. Rosse, Sexual Hypochondriasis and Perversion of the Genesic [sic] In-
stinct, 17 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 795 (1892), excerpted in KATZ, ALMANAC, supra note
86, at 232.
138. Id. at 802, 807, excerpted in KArz, ALMANAC, supra note 86, at 233-34.
139. LYDSTON, supra note 132, at 394.
140. Id.
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was widely
believed that the fabric of society and the body politick were
threatened by degenerate classes in general, and prostitutes in particu-
lar. Committees of citizens banding together to study and eliminate
prostitution found surprising evidence of sexual inversion as well. Chi-
cago's Vice Commission, for example, reported vaudeville perform-
ances at bawdy houses where men impersonated women and solicited
men for "pervert[ed] practices."'' New York City's Committee of
Fourteen, organized in 1905 to suppress prostitution, uncovered and
reported bawdy houses where men solicited other men,14 a and by 1921
the Committee dedicated itself to suppressing degeneracy as well.
Such findings were by no means limited to big cities. The Lancaster,
Pennsylvania vice commission reported "[c]onsiderable evidence (im-
possible to print) of the practice of perversion in Lancaster by inmates
of [bawdy] houses, by street walkers, by charity girls, and by men per-
verts or 'fairies,' and degenerates."' 43
The citizen reformers vented an outrage far more intense than
the concerns raised by ivory tower sexologists. Anthony Comstock,
the antiprostitution crusader who founded the New York Society for
the Prevention of Vice, reportedly had this to say about androgynes
when he read the autobiography of one:
These inverts are not fit to live with the rest of mankind. They
ought to have branded in their foreheads the word "Unclean,"
and as the lepers of old, they ought to cry "Unclean! Unclean!" as
they go about, and instead of the [crime against nature] law mak-
ing twenty years imprisonment the penalty for their crime, it
ought to be imprisonment for life."'
Comstock captured a central theme of popular prejudice: Inverts, like
prostitutes, did more than commit bad acts; like lepers, they were a
status group defined by their disease as much as by their actions. His
Society in the 1910s assisted the New York police in apprehending
male degenerates by spying on public toilets, male bawdy houses, and
dance halls and saloons where sexual inverts socialized.
14 5
141. VICE COMM'N OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO: A STUDY OF EXISTIrN
CONDITIONS, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 139 (1911). Similar connections are in HARTFORD VICE
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE HARTFORD VICE COMMISSION 37 (1913); VICE COMM'N OF PHILADEL-
PHIA, A REPORT OF EXISTING CONDITIONS, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1913).
142. See F.H. WHrrlN, SEXUAL PERVERSION CASES IN NEW YORK CITY COURTS, 1916-1921,
Bulletin #1480 of the Comm. of Fourteen (New York City 1921), excerpted in Eskridge, supra
note 109, at 1044.
143. LANCASTER (PA) CITIZENS COMM'N, A REPORT ON VICE CONDMONS IN THE CITY OF
LANCASTER, PA. 44 (1913).
144. EARL LIND, ATOBIOGRAPHY OF AN ANDROGYNE 24-25 (1918) (quoting Comstock's
alleged reaction to Lind's autobiography).
145. See WHITIN, supra note 142, excerpted in Eskridge, supra note 109, at 1044.
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3. New Specifications of the Crime Against Nature
In light of the developments detailed above, the early nineteenth
century's "unmentionable" crime against nature provoked increased
public mention in the last quarter of the century. The classic sodomy
scenario (the powerful man forcing anal intercourse upon a weaker
victim) gave way to a broader ambit for the crime against nature,
which came to be applied against a larger array of gender-benders.
It appears, for example, that sodomy laws were for the first time
applied against women, probably prostitutes for the most part. The
Census reported only one woman incarcerated for sodomy or the
crime against nature in 1880.146 That changed in the next genera-
tion.147 New York City's arrest records regularly reveal female perpe-
trators of sodomy after 1900; thirty-one of the 601 persons arrested
between 1901 and 1910 were women, as were eighteen of 914 arrested
between 1911 and 1920; thirty-two of 1142 arrested between 1921 and
1930; and twenty-four of 1446 arrested between 1931 and 1940.148 In
Baltimore, women were not regularly arrested for sodomy until the
state created a new crime of "unnatural lascivious acts" in 1916. From
1917 through 1945 an average of one or two women were arrested
each year.149 Although these numbers remain tiny compared with
those for men and boys, they are a remarkable turning point in the
history of sodomy, which had traditionally been a crime only men
could commit.
Relatedly and most importantly, attention turned from anal to
oral sex. The man sodomizing another man, youth, or woman was sup-
plemented with and indeed supplanted by examples of oral sex-men
fellating men or youths, women fellating men, men engaging in cunni-
lingus with women, and (much later) women engaging in cunnilingus
with women. Anglo-American law started to regulate oral sex in the
late nineteenth century. In 1817, English courts held oral sex not to be
covered by the Act of 1533.110 Sixty-eight years later, Parliament re-
sponded with the Labouchere Amendment to the Criminal Law
Amendments Act of 1885, an act mainly concerned with prostitution
and brothels. Section 11 of the Amendment provided:
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party
to the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the
commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency
146. See WINES, supra note 110, excerpted in KATZ, AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 86, at
37.
147. In addition to the material in text, see generally NIcOLEu HAHN RAFTER, PARTIAL JUS-
TICE: WOMEN, PRISONS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (2d ed. 1990).
148. The figures in text are compiled by the author from the annual police reports for New
York City (sources on file with author).
149. The figures in text are compiled by the author from the annual police reports for Balti-
more (sources on file with author).
150. See Rex v. Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B. 1817).
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with another male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the
court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years,
with or without hard labour. 151
The Labouchere Amendment created a new crime which was not lim-
ited by the common law to anal sex alone, and unlike prior lewdness
or obscenity laws it applied to private as well as public activities. The
lesser penalty for the oral sex entailed by "gross indecency" suggested
a new focus on consensual, rather than rape-like, intimacy contrary to
nature. Finally, the Labouchere Amendment was significant because it
is the law that snared Oscar Wilde in 1895. His trials for gross inde-
cency were publicized in the United States as well as England.1
52
American judges and commentators in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury followed, with no published exception, the rule of the 1817 Eng-
lish case, that oral sex was not sodomy or buggery or the crime against
nature. 53 Pennsylvania was the first state in this country to respond
formally to the unease respectable society felt with new communities
of inverts socialized around practices not regulated by old-fashioned
sodomy statutes. In 1879, six years before England adopted the
Labouchere Amendment, Pennsylvania enacted the first detailed stat-
utory specification in the Anglo-American legisprudence of what
"sodomy" might be:
[T]he terms sodomy and buggery... shall be understood to be a
carnal copulation by human beings with each other against nature
res veneria in ano, or with a beast, and shall be taken to cover and
include the act or acts where any person shall wilfully and wick-
edly have carnal knowledge, in a manner against nature, of any
other person, by penetrating the mouth of such person; and any
person who shall wickedly suffer or permit any other person to
wickedly and indecently penetrate, in a manner against nature,
his or her mouth, by carnal intercourse, he, she and every such
person, committing any of the acts aforesaid or suffering the same
151. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., ch. 69, § 11 (Eng.). The legislative
background, and Labouchere's own murky motives, are discussed in F.B. Smith, Labouchere's
Amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 17 HIST. STUD. 165 (1976).
152. Wilde was a noted author and playwright (including the homoerotic The Picture of
Dorian Gray), an ultrafashionable dandy, and an invert (also the father of two children) with the
wickedest tongue in England. The pugilistic Marquess of Queensbury accused Wilde of posing as
a sodomite. Wilde sued the Marquess for libel in March 1895. Queensbury's lawyers, however,
had the names of several young men Wilde had solicited to commit sexual acts for pay. The
judge threw out Wilde's lawsuit, and the police arrested him on charges of sodomy (anal sex) and
gross indecency (oral sex). Wilde's two criminal trials in April and May 1895 were an interna-
tional sensation. Newspapers in the United States as well as England reported the testimony of
male prostitutes from whom Wilde had apparently solicited sex, of the chambermaids who cor-
roborated their acquaintance with the defendant and the mess their lovemaking left in bed, and
of Wilde himself. See RICHARD ELLMANN, OSCAR WILDE 435-80 (1st Am. ed. 1988).
153. See 2 BIsHOP, supra note 97, at 731; WHARTON, supra note 104, at 443; 1 WHARTON,
supra note 105, at 512.
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to be committed as aforesaid, shall be guilty of the crime of sod-
omy or buggery .... "I
The Pennsylvania statute was an ambitious response, including wo-
men as well as men and the receiver as well as giver of oral sex. Fol-
lowing the Pennsylvania approach of specifying the crime against
nature more precisely within state sodomy laws to include oral sex,
were New York (1886), Ohio (1889), Wyoming (1890), Louisiana
(1896), Wisconsin (1897), Iowa (1902), Washington (1909), Missouri
(1911), Oregon (1913), Nebraska (1913), North Dakota (1913),
Alaska (1915), Virginia (1916),- Minnesota (1921), Utah (1923), and
West Virginia (1931). 155 Following the English approach of creating a
separate crime for oral sex, other states adopted laws prohibiting
"gross indecency" (Michigan (1903),156 whose statute copied
Labouchere's Amendment) or "unnatural and lascivious act[s]" (Mas-
sachusetts (1887), 57 New Hampshire (1899),158 Maryland (1916), 159
Arizona (1917),160 Florida (1917)161) or "carnal indecency" (New
Jersey (1906)162), or, most directly, "fellatio and cunnilingus" and
"oral copulation" (California (1915, 1921)163). By 1923, about half of
the American state legislatures had enacted statutes making oral sex a
new criminal felony.
In states where the legislature was slow to act, police sought to
expand their vague crime against nature laws to include oral sex. At
first, they were unsuccessful. The leading case was the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals' 1893 decision in Prindle v. State.1 64 The Texas stat-
ute prohibited "the abominable and detestable crime against na-
ture.''165 With no definition of the term, the court felt constrained to
154. Act of June 11, 1879, 1879 Pa. Laws 148.
155. See Act of Apr. 26, 1915, ch. 22, 1915 Alaska Laws 50; Act of Mar. 31, 1902, ch. 148,
§ 1, 1902 Iowa Acts 107; Act of July 9, 1896, No. 69, § 1, 1896 La. Acts 102; Act of Apr. 12, 1921,
ch. 224, § 1, 1921 Minn. Laws 277; Act of Mar. 30, 1911, 1911 Mo. Laws 198; Act of Apr. 8, 1913,
ch. 69, § 1, 1913 Neb. Laws 203, 203; Act of Mar. 1, 1886, ch. 31, § 6, 1886 N.Y. Laws 39, 41; N.D.
COMP. LAws § 9615 (1913); Act of Apr. 12, 1889, § 1, 1889 Ohio Laws 251; Act of Jan. 13, 1913,
ch. 21, 1913 Or. Laws 56; Act of Feb. 17, 1923, ch. 13, 1923 Utah Laws 21; Act of Mar. 18, 1916,
ch. 295, 1916 Va. Acts 511; Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 204, 1909 Wash. Laws 890, 950; W.
VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 8, § 13 (1931); Act of Apr. 9, 1897, ch. 198, 1897 Wis. Laws 359; Wyo. REV.
STAT. § 5067 (1899).
156. Act of June 10, 1903, No. 198, § 1, 1903 Mich. Pub. Acts 295; see also Act of May 26,
1939, No. 148, 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts 294 (adding crime of gross indecency between females).
157. Act of June 16, 1887, § 1, 1887 Mass. Acts 1099.
158. Act of Mar. 7, 1899, ch. 33, 1899 N.H. Laws 270.
159. Act of Apr. 18, 1916, 1916 Md. Laws 1296.
160. Act of Feb. 15, 1917, ch. 2, § 1, 1917 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2.
161. Act of May 28, 1917, ch. 7361, No. 103, § 1, 1917 Fla. Laws 211.
162. Act of Apr. 2, 1906, ch. 71, 1906 N.J. Laws 101.
163. Act of June 1, 1915, ch. 586, sec. 1, § 288(a), 1915 Cal. Stat. 1022, repealed and replaced
by Act of June 3, 1921, ch. 848, 1921 Cal. Stat. 1633.
164. 21 S.W. 360, 360-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (followed in Mitchell v. State, 95 S.W. 500,
500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906)); see also Munoz v. State, 281 S.W. 857, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926);
Harvey v. State, 115 S.W. 1193, 1193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1909) (opining charge of oral sex "too
horrible to contemplate," and legislation must be adopted to cover "these unnatural crimes").
165. Prindle, 21 S.W. at 361 (quoting Ex parte Bergen, 14 Tex. App. 52, 53 (1883))
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follow the common law, which limited sodomy to anal sex. The judges
expressed anguish that the law failed to reach this abominable phe-
nomenon, but opined that the legislature should fix the problem.
166
Prindle was followed in California (1897), Kentucky (1909), Nebraska
(1910), Arizona (1912), Utah (1913), Virginia (1923), Colorado
(1927), and (much later) New Mexico (1953).167 In all these states,
except New Mexico, the narrow judicial interpretation was overridden
by legislation broadening the definition of sodomy or, in the cases of
California and Arizona, creating a new crime.
168
By the turn of the century, however, the specification of sodomy
to include oral sex sometimes came through dynamic police and judi-
cial interpretation of old sodomy laws. Because state laws used elastic
terms such as "crime against nature" or "carnal knowledge," without
definition or elaboration, judges could reason from the underlying
goals of sodomy laws: oral sex was analogous to anal sex (sodomy) in
their shared "unnaturalness," or inability to contribute to the procrea-
tive project. As the Illinois Supreme Court said in the leading case,
Honselman v. People, oral sex "is as much against nature.., as sod-
omy qr any bestial or unnatural copulation that can be conceived.'
'1 69
Honselman was followed by the highest courts of Georgia (1904),
South Dakota (1910), North Carolina (1914), Alabama (1914), Ne-
vada (1914), Delaware (1915), Montana (1915), Idaho (1916),
Oklahoma (1917), Hawaii (1922), and Kansas (1925).17 ° Note that
these are rural states of the South and West for the most part. States
with big cities (apart from Illinois) all accomplished the new regula-
tion by prospective legislation.
The legal process of statutory amendment and dynamic judicial
and police interpretation of sodomy laws entailed an analytical dis-
course specifying what was forbidden and what was acceptable sexual
conduct. The 1879 Pennsylvania law identified for the first time pre-
cisely what body parts could be involved in the crime against nature
166. See id.
167. See Weaver v. Territory, 127 P. 724, 724 (Ariz. 1912); People v. Boyle, 48 P. 800, 800
(Cal. 1897); Koontz v. People, 263 P. 19, 21-22 (Colo. 1927); Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 118
S.W. 943, 944 (Ky. 1909); Kinnan v. State, 125 N.W. 594, 594-95 (Neb. 1910); Bennett v. Abram,
253 P.2d 316, 317 (N.M. 1953); State v. Johnson, 137 P. 632 (Utah 1913); Wise v. Commonwealth,
115 S.E. 508, 509-11 (Va. 1923).
168. See Act of Feb. 15, 1917, ch. 2, § 1, 1917 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2; Act of June 1, 1915, ch. 586,
sec. 1, § 288(a), 1915 Cal. Laws 1022, repealed and replaced by Act of June 3, 1921, ch. 848, 1921
Cal. Laws 1633; Act of Apr. 3, 1939, ch. 97, 1939 Colo. Sess. Laws 318; Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch.
406, §§ 87-90, 1974 Ky. Acts 831, 847; Act of Apr. 8, 1913, ch. 69, 1913 Neb. Laws 203; Act of
Mar. 4, 1955, ch. 78, 1955 N.M. Laws 132; Act of Feb. 17, 1917, ch. 13, 1923 Utah Laws 21; Act of
Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 358, 1924 Va. Acts 516.
169. 48 N.E. 304, 305 (IU. 1897).
170. See Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876 (Ga. 1904); State v. Whitmarsh, 128 N.W. 580 (S.D.
1910); State v. Fenner, 80 S.E. 970 (N.C. 1914); Woods v. State, 64 So. 508 (Ala. 1914); Ex parte
Benites, 140 P. 436 (Nev. 1914); State v. Maida, 96 A. 207 (Del. 1915); State v. Guerin, 152 P. 747
(Mont. 1915); State v. Altwatter, 157 P. 256 (Idaho 1916); Ex parte De Ford, 168 P. 58 (Okla.
1917); Territory v. Wilson, 26 Haw. 360 (1922); State v. Hurlbert, 234 P. 945 (Kan. 1925).
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and that level of statutory detail gradually became the norm as states
revised their sodomy laws in the next generation. Relatedly, judicial
opinions reviewing sodomy convictions, which were often just a para-
graph in length earlier in the century, began to describe the circum-
stances of the crime and the relationship of the parties, rather than
just announcing that "unmentionable" conduct had occurred. Most of
the opinions engaged in a reasoning process, rather than just denounc-
ing the "abominable" nature of the conduct and the crime. (These
developments occurred later in the South.) Treatises and practice
manuals chatted about the crime against nature. This legal discourse
paralleled the medical and popular discourse that was creating the
idea of "sexuality" in the West during this era.
C. The Transformations of Sodomy Laws, 1920-1986
Sodomy laws went through several more transformations in the
two generations after World War I. The main transformation was an
explicit association of sodomy (the act) with homosexuality (the sta-
tus)-and the association of both with child molestation (act) and sex-
ual psychopathy (status). As mainstream society focused increasing
attention onto the homosexual-identifying, hunting, and suppressing
him-homosexuals started thinking of themselves as a minority group,
with possible legal rights. Once the objects of regulatory discourse
("sodomites," "degenerates," "homosexuals") announced their per-
sonal subjectivities, it became possible to talk about "consensual" as
opposed to "forcible" sodomy or sodomy with a minor. During the
antihomosexual mania following World War II, informed opinion
questioned whether sodomy laws should be applied to intercourse be-
tween consenting adults. This did not translate into actual sodomy law
repeal until the 1970s, when the laws dropped like flies and, except in
the South, largely ceased to be enforced against adults having consen-
sual sex with one another in private places.
1. The Sodomite as Sexual Psychopath, 1921-1946
World War I was one watershed in the enforcement of sodomy
laws. In cities such as New York, San Francisco, Baltimore, Chicago,
Boston, St. Louis, and Philadelphia, sodomy arrests during the 1920s
continued at a significantly higher level than before the war.' 71 An-
other big shift in the statistics came during and after the Great De-
pression. The big cities of the East, Midwest, and West Coast
continued to arrest many people for sodomy, and the crime began to
be enforced regularly by cities in the South as well.172 There is some
evidence of stronger sex law enforcement activity, generally, in the
171. See Eskridge, supra note 109, at 1111.
172. See id. at 1117 app. 2C, 1112 app. 2A.
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1930s. 17 3 What is most remarkable, in this regard, was the boom in
arrests of homosexuals for public activities such as cruising, dancing,
cross-dressing, kissing, groping, fondling, and even hand holding in
public or semipublic spaces. Such public activity could violate any
number of state or municipal laws-including laws prohibiting disor-
derly conduct, sexual solicitation, lewdness, indecent exposure, va-
grancy, loitering, and cross-dressing or even "disguise." '174 These
(public) conduct laws eclipsed (private) sodomy laws as means of po-
licing homosexuals or suppressing their culture. To take a dramatic
example, in 1949 New York City arrested 112 men for sodomy, but
931 for violating the disorderly conduct law provision covering "de-
generate" acts, and a whopping 2213 for violating a law against loiter-
ing around public toilets.
175
The raw statistics reflected a shift in American thinking about sex
offenses in the 1920s and 1930s. 176 Reflecting concepts about sexuality
propounded by the American followers of Freud, regulators focused
their concern on the "sexual psychopath"-the aggressive male who
could not control his impulses and threatened children. The homosex-
ual male was identified as the quintessential sexual psychopath, and
regulatory attention was sharply focused on this new creature. Re-
sponsive to this alarm were a series of "sexual psychopath" laws,
which allowed the state to incarcerate sex offenders for indeterminate
periods of time, until they were cured. The first laws were enacted in
Michigan in 1935 and Illinois in 1937.177 More than half the state legis-
latures (including those in all the big-city states) and Congress, for the
District of Columbia, followed the Michigan-Illinois experiment with
sexual psychopath laws between 1939 and 1960.178 A large portion of
the men arrested under these laws were homosexual men, sometimes
engaging in consensual oral sex and sometimes engaging in sex with
minors. 179 Conversely, the increase in sodomy law enforcement in-
cluded adult men having sex with other adult men, but the over-
whelming majority of arrests in New York and California were for
unconsented sodomy with women and minors.18 °
173. See id. at 1121 app. 2E.
174. See id. at 1032-45.
175. See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 208 (1951).
176. The best source on this shift is Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Re-
sponse to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83 (1987). Lucid contemporary
conceptualization along the lines that follow can be found in Bernard C. Glueck, An Evaluation
of the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 187 (1956).
177. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet,
1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 825 app. 4 (1997).
178. The laws are collected, described, and analyzed in Eskridge, supra note 177, at 703; see
also Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 21 CRIM. L. COM-
MENTS & ABSTRACTS 215 (1960).
179. See PAUL TAPPAN, THE HABrIUAL SEX OFFENDER: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 28-29 (1949).
180. See Eskridge, supra note 109, at 1060.
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2. The Impulse to Reform, 1947-1961
The McCarthy era, roughly 1947 through 1957, witnessed unprec-
edented numbers of arrests for consensual oral sex between adults,
because local vice squads invested substantial resources in detection
of private and semipublic activities.181 Ironically, it was during that
period that a modest sodomy law reform movement began. The first
public retreat from the antihomosexual sodomy regime began with
New York Governor Thomas Dewey's veto of a sexual psychopath
law in 1947.182 Dewey opposed the law because it was not grounded in
expert opinion about what would actually contribute to the state's
struggle against child molestation. A study commission headed by Dr.
Bernard Glueck laid the groundwork for and drafted a 1950 law that
required psychiatric reports to assist the sentencing of sex offenders
and provided for indeterminate sentences and medical treatment in
appropriate cases.' 83 Most significantly, the 1950 statute reduced the
crime of consensual sodomy to a misdemeanor; forcible sodomy and
sodomy with a minor, the primary focus of concern according to
Glueck's reports, remained serious felonies.
184
Sex offender study commissions dominated by medical and legal
experts filed influential reports in New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, Cali-
fornia, and other states.'85 Following Paul Tappan's suggestions in
New Jersey's report on sex offenders, the Illinois Commission on Sex
Offenders, chaired by Professor Francis Allen of Northwestern Uni-
versity Law School, constructed its 1953 report around the "distinc-
tion . . .between sexual deviates whose conduct in the community
offends morals (homosexuals, exhibitionists), and dangerous, aggres-
sive offenders whose behavior is a community threat (aggressive rap-
ist[s], etc.)."' 86 Like Tappan and the New Jersey Commission, the
Illinois Commission urged regulatory action to focus on (1) "repetitive
compulsive acts" (peeping toms), (2) "forced relations," and (3) rela-
tions involving an adult and a minor."' A thesis of both reports, as
well as those in California and New York, was that consensual same-
181. See Eskridge, supra note 177, at 724-33.
182. See COMMISSIONER OF MENTAL HYGIENE & COMM'R OF CORRECTION, REPORT ON
STUDY OF 102 SEX OFFENDERS AT SING SING PRISON 11 (1950).
183. See BERNARD C. GLUECK, FINAL REPORT: RESEARCH PROJECT FOR THE STUDY AND
TREATMENT OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES INVOLVING SEXUAL ABERRATIONS (1955).
184. See Act of Apr. 11, 1950, ch. 575, § 15, 1950 N.Y. Laws 1271, 1278-79.
185. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, FINAL REPORT ON CALIFORNIA SEXUAL
DEVIATION RESEARCH (1954); ILLINOIS COMM'N ON SEX OFFENDERS, REPORT ON THE ILLINOIS
COMMISSION ON SEX OFFENDERS TO THE 68TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(1953) [hereinafter ILLINOIS COMM'N ON SEX OFFENDERS]; GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMM'N, RE-
PORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON THE DEVIATED CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER
(Mich. 1958); PAUL W. TAPPAN, N.J. COMM'N ON THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER, THE HABIT-
UAL SEX OFFENDER: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL
SEX OFFENDER (1949).
186. ILLINOIS COMM'N ON SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 185, at 11.
187. Id. at 9.
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sex intimacy in private places was essentially not the concern of the
law. Indeed, application of the criminal sanction in such cases had del-
eterious effects-diverting police resources from serious crimes like
rape and child molestation, providing opportunities for blackmail, and
possibly contributing to police and other public corruption.
Following the New York, Illinois, and New Jersey sex offender
commissions and echoing their libertarian reasoning, the influential
American Law Institute (ALI) narrowly voted in May 1955 to
decriminalize consensual sodomy in a tentative draft of its proposed
Model Penal Code.188 Expressly adopting a Millian, libertarian posi-
tion, the ALI explained that "[n]o harm to the secular interests of the
community is involved in a typical sex practice in private between con-
senting adults. This area of private morals is the distinctive concern of
spiritual authorities."' 89 The drafters invoked the "protection to which
every individual is entitled against state interference in his personal
affairs when he is not hurting others."' 190 Criminalizing such practices
sapped valuable police resources, fueled blackmail rings, and undercut
"the protection to which every individual is entitled against state in-
terference in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others."'19
In 1961, a coalition of lawyers and medical experts chaired by
Professor Charles Bowman of the University of Illinois persuaded the
Illinois legislature to adopt the Model Penal Code and thereby to
eliminate criminal sanctions for adult consensual sodomy. 192 Law revi-
sion commissions in Minnesota, New York, and Maryland made simi-
lar proposals that were considered and rejected by their state
legislatures in the 1960s.' 93 Florida and other states debated such a
move, with medical experts and law professors supporting it and law
enforcement officers and religious groups generally in opposition.194
The main argument raised against repealing sodomy laws was that
such a move would reflect state tolerance or even approval of homo-
188. This move was made in section 207.5 of Tentative Draft No. 4 of the proposed Model
Penal Code, which also decriminalized fornication, adultery, and other sexual crimes not involv-
ing violence or children. See Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1969).
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 cmrts. (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955); see also Louis B.
Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 675-76 (1963).
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 cmts. (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955).
191. Id.
192. See Eskridge, supra note 177, at 775.
193. See Robert G. Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland
Criminal Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?, 30 MD.
L. REV. 91, 104-11 (1970).
194. See Eskridge, supra note 177, at 775-77, 829 app. 6 (summary transcript of Florida
revision commission debate).
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sexuality. 195 No other state decriminalized consensual sodomy until
Connecticut did so in its 1969 criminal code revision.
196
3. Legal Shift from Consensual to Forcible Sodomy, 1969-1986
As written, Griswold celebrated the "bilateral loyalty" of com-
panionate marriage, and not sexual liberty. Concurring opinions by
Justices Harlan and Goldberg distanced the case from "homosexual-
ity."'" In the context of the Millian debate instigated by the Model
Penal Code and by an increasingly vocal gay-rights movement, how-
ever, Griswold was revolutionary. It opened federal courts, for the
first time, to serious constitutional claims that the state could not
criminalize sodomy and other sexual activity between consenting
adults in private spaces.
The pace of constitutional challenge and legal reform quickened
considerably after 1969.198 One reason was the burgeoning gay libera-
tion movement unleashed by the Stonewall riots of June 1969-which
propelled a whole generation of gay people out of the closet and into
the public arena. Relatedly, women's liberation and the new accepta-
bility of nonmarital sex pressed for a broader view of the privacy
right-from the marital right in Griswold to a right to sexual pleasure
in the home (Stanley), to sexual intimacy among unmarried persons
(Eisenstadt), and to control of one's pregnant body (Roe). The Millian
ideal of the Model Penal Code gained ground during the sexual
revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s.
The political energy released by these developments invigorated
the movement to nullify or ameliorate consensual sodomy laws. Be-
tween 1969 and 1975, twelve state legislatures followed Illinois to re-
peal their consensual sodomy laws: California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington. 199 In three states (Alaska, Florida,
Massachusetts), courts partially invalidated their state laws.2 °° By the
beginning of 1981, eleven more states had revoked all criminal penal-
ties for private sodomy between consenting adults-eight by statute
(Alaska, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia, Wyoming), two by judicial decision (New York, Pennsylvania),
and one by a joint effort (New Jersey).20 ' Twelve other states by 1981
had either reduced consensual sodomy from a felony to a misde-
195. See id. at 776.
196. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Con-
ditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
817, 843 (1997).
197. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); id. at 486 (concurring
opinions).
198. See Eskridge, supra note 196, at 819-28, 842-57.
199. See infra Appendix.
200. See infra Appendix.
201. See infra Appendix.
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meanor (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin) or circumscribed the penalty to
misdemeanor level (Minnesota, Nevada).2 "2 In less than a generation,
almost four-fifths of the states declassified consensual sodomy as a
felony. This was remarkable.
Equally remarkable was the opposition to sodomy repeal, for the
possibility of gay liberation from criminal sanction helped galvanize
traditionalist "religious right" coalitions in many states. California's
repeal in 1975 followed an intense debate in which a highly orches-
trated opposition argued that decriminalizing "homosexuality" would
lead to venereal disease and send a message to impressionable chil-
dren that "homosexuality is okay. ' 20 3 The strategy of isolating sodomy
to homosexuality and exploiting social homophobia worked better in
states of the Baptist South and Mormon West. Idaho in 1971 adopted
a new criminal code, closely tracking the Model Penal Code, that
decriminalized consensual sodomy.20 4 When this fact gained public at-
tention, religious leaders objected that Idaho would become a haven
for "sex deviates," and the legislature in 1972 repealed the new code
and reinstated the old one-for no other reason than to express an-
tihomosexual policies.2 5 Arkansas had the same reaction when it
adopted a Model Penal Code type reform, but its legislative response
was more typical: the legislature in 1977 reinstated consensual sodomy
as a crime, albeit only as a misdemeanor and only applicable to same-
sex (homosexual), not different-sex (heterosexual) sodomy.2°6 Seven
of the twelve misdemeanor laws (Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Mis-
souri, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas) plus the felony law of Montana
criminalized only homosexual, and not heterosexual, sodomy.20 7
Enforcement of sodomy laws also changed after 1961. In the
1960s and early 1970s, urban police forces arrested more gay people
than ever before for consensual, adult sexual activities, but they were
met, for the first time, with organized opposition. Homophile and gay
liberation groups in New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and
elsewhere protested police harassment through selective enforcement
of sodomy and solicitation laws.20 8 Following this pressure and the
views of an increasing number of experts, the focus of sodomy law
prosecution shifted decisively after 1969, away from cases of consen-
sual homosexual intimacy, toward cases of forcible sodomy, usually by
202. See infra Appendix.
203. Eskridge, supra note 196, at 849.
204. See id. at 847 & n.123. The statutory references are in the Appendix to this article.
205. See id.
206. See Act of Mar. 28, 1977, No. 828, § 1, 1977 Ark. Acts 2118, 2118-19.
207. See references for these states in the Appendix to this article. Oklahoma achieved the
same result by judicial decision invalidating the state sodomy law as it applied to heterosexual
intercourse, but not homosexual intercourse. See Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.
1986).
208. See Eskridge, supra note 196, at 828-42.
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a man against a woman, and sodomy with minors, usually by men with
girls (often daughters or stepdaughters). 09 Outside the South, sodomy
laws were rarely if ever enforced against consenting adults, homosex-
ual or heterosexual. Almost all of the reported cases involving consen-
sual sodomy after 1969 arose in the South, whose police continued to
use decoy cops to entrap gay people and to spy on patrons of public
rest rooms and adult bookstores long after such practices dried up in
New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and other large cities in the
Northeast, Midwest, and West.210 Thus, when the Atlanta police
harassed and ultimately arrested Michael Hardwick in 1982,211 they
were playing an old game, but one that was increasingly controversial.
That five Justices of the Supreme Court validated their arrest, how-
ever, was just the beginning of a new, critical chapter in the ongoing
history of laws regulating consensual sodomy.
III. A HISTORICIST CRITIQUE OF HARDWICK
Like most lawyers, Justice White was using history for argumen-
tative, rhetorical, or even partisan purposes. That the historical, and
historiographical, story is more complex can hardly be surprising. I
disagree with Justice White's understanding of precedent, history, and
"homosexual sodomy," but do not want to mirror his mistake by sim-
ply debunking his history and turning it, with equal simplicity, to
Hardwick's advantage. A more sophisticated understanding of history
enables us to understand Bowers v. Hardwick more deeply. And while
it does corrode the persuasiveness of the Court's opinion, history,
properly understood, raises more questions than it answers, in this
case and in others as well.
As Anne Goldstein has argued, Justice White's opinion is anach-
ronistic-conflating oral sex with sodomy and the new twentieth cen-
tury category "homosexual" with the historic biblical category of
"sodomy. 2 12 The history presented in part II of this article elaborates
on her point in irrefutable detail, but the question remains: So what?
Why should a more sophisticated history of sodomy laws, and the nov-
elty of their application to oral sex matter? Is the history relevant to
the Court's normative inquiries, namely, making sense of the prece-
dents and suggesting a limiting principle for the privacy right? In this
part, I maintain that a more nuanced historical account helps us un-
derstand deeper inconsistencies between Hardwick and the previous
precedents, the erosion of professional and academic support for
209. This claim will be documented in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (forthcoming from Harvard University Press, 1999).
210. See, e.g., State v. Enslin, 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Leibman v. State, 652
S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
211. The story behind the case is told in Hardwick's own words in PETER IRONS, THE COUR-
AGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 392-403 (1988).
212. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 1081-89.
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Hardwick and its current outlier status, and inherent practical as well
as conceptual difficulties with originalism as a constitutional
methodology.
A. Sodomy and Normalizing Regimes
Criminal laws operate both negatively and positively. They act
negatively by stigmatizing certain conduct; they act positively by nor-
malizing the conduct not prohibited. The rational basis test of the Due
Process Clause all but requires a normalizing as well as stigmatizing
goal for criminal laws. From the perspective of the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Framers of the Fifth (1791) and Fourteenth (1868)
Amendments, sodomy laws can be thought of as reflecting any or all
of three normalizing regimes: carnal pleasure is immoral or illegal un-
less it is both procreative and marital, must be nonpredatory, or must
reflect traditional gender roles of insertive man and receptive woman.
Justice White, however, chose an option unavailable to the Framers of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whose intent he invoked. 13
This is another way of showing how an original intent methodology
cannot coherently support Justice White's choice in Michael Hard-
wick's case.
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) or the Fifth
Amendment (1791) would have rationalized sodomy laws as requiring
that sex occur within procreative marriage. That was the biblical ra-
tionale and the one accepted by both Roman Catholic and Protestant
theologians for centuries. It was the normalizing regime supported by
colonial and early American morals legislation. By prohibiting forni-
cation (penile-vaginal sex by unmarried men and women), adultery
(penile-vaginal sex by men and women who were married but not to
each other), rape (always defined to be outside of marriage), and sod-
omy (specifically, anal sex), the early colonies and the states were
reinforcing the cultural message that carnal pleasure must be procrea-
tive and must occur within marriage.
But Justice White did not emphasize the Framers' normalizing
regime as the justification for sodomy laws, because it was foreclosed
by the Court's precedents. The Court's earliest privacy decisions, Gris-
wold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, recognized as fundamental a woman's and
a man's right not to procreate when they had penile-vaginal inter-
course. Although Griswold emphasized marriage as a locus for pri-
vacy, Roe and Eisenstadt expanded privacy rights to nonmarital
contexts. Read together, these precedents found protection for carnal
liberty in the Due Process Clause and rejected the marriage- and pro-
creation-based regime of the colonial period and the early Republic.
The right of privacy, as the Court has articulated it, is inconsistent
213. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
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with Justice White's narrow originalism, and so the Hardwick inquiry
started with incoherent premises.
The incoherence of an originalist approach is even worse in Hard-
wick's case, for the oral sex for which he was arrested was not known
as "sodomy" or the "crime against nature" in any American jurisdic-
tion in 1791 or 1868. Oral sex might conceivably have been proscribed
by the New Haven statute of 1656 or by John Cotton's proposed but
rejected law for Massachusetts Bay, but it was not on the regulatory
agenda after the Revolution or the Civil War. Even as late as 1868,
there was no authoritative American statute or judicial decision dis-
agreeing with the English rule that oral sex was not a crime against
nature.214
That legal equilibrium changed in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century and the first quarter of the next. Significantly, a large
majority of the states accomplished the transition by statute, creating
a new crime that was by definition prospective in operation. Almost
all the biggest states, those with urban populations, engaged in this
prospective process: Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Virginia, Florida, Texas, Ohio, Michigan, and California.215 Ja-
net Halley points out that Georgia's decisions declaring oral sex to be
a crime against nature purported to declare preexisting "natural law,"
and not to innovate new law.2 16 This reflects judges' tendency to deny
legal innovation, especially when interpreting criminal laws, once the
idea of "common law crimes" became suspect (as it did in the late
nineteenth century), and not any consensus that oral sex had been a
crime against nature "all along." Indeed, Georgia was the only me-
dium-population state to follow Illinois's Honselman decision, and
Georgia's judges were openly ambivalent about their innovation. In a
1904 libel case (not a criminal prosecution) the Georgia Supreme
Court found fellatio to be sodomy. The court extended that idea to
male-on-female cunnilingus in 1917, found cunnilingus between two
women not to be sodomy in 1939, and overruled the application of
sodomy law to any kind of cunnilingus in 1963.217 It was not com-
pletely clear until a statutory rewrite in 1968 that all kinds of oral sex
were sodomy in Georgia.2 18
214. The first mention of oral sex as possible sodomy that I have found in the commentiries,
is WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAm L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 706
n.415 (2d ed. 1912). Compare the earlier treatises, cited in supra note 97.
215. See infra Appendix.
216. See Halley, supra note 13, at 1760-67.
217. See Riley v. Garrett, 133 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1963) (overruling application of sodomy law
to cunnilingus); Thompson v. Aldredge, 200 S.E. 799 (Ga. 1939) (finding cunnilingus between
two women not sodomy); Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876 (Ga. 1904) (finding fellatio to be sod-
omy); Comer v. State, 94 S.E. 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 1917) (finding cunnilingus to be sodomy).
218. See Act of Apr. 10, 1968, ch. 26-20, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1249, 1299 (adding GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-2002 (1968)).
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In short, Justice White's originalist approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment stands in contrast not only to the Court's previous re-
fusal to follow an originalist approach to that amendment in Griswold
and Roe, but also to Justice White's own nonoriginalist approach to
the state sodomy laws he charged the Framers with knowing and ap-
proving.2"9 At the level of specific intent, it would not have occurred to
a single Framer that sodomy involved consensual oral sex. At the level
of general intent, every Framer would have thought the purpose of
sodomy laws to be assurance that carnal pleasure could occur only
within the context of procreative marriage, an unconstitutional goal
under the Court's post-1960 privacy jurisprudence.
It might be objected that, if the Framers had "thought about" or
"known about" oral sex, they would have been so appalled that they
would have considered it a crime against nature. They probably would
have been appalled,220 but not every appalling thing was sodomy, as
the common law firmly held.221 Moreover, the Framers might have
been reluctant to categorize consensual oral sex as sodomy, because
their second-best rationale for sodomy laws was protection of vulnera-
ble people and animals against predatory rape-like conduct. At com-
mon law, sodomy and rape were sibling crimes. Both were considered
"carnal knowledge" entailing violent assaults upon the person of the
victim,2 22 the law originally required penetration and emission in both
crimes but abandoned the emission requirement for both in the nine-
teenth century,223 and consent on the part of the accomplice made it
harder and usually impossible to prove each crime. As to the last
point, where the victim of sodomy consented to the act, her or his
evidence required independent corroboration.224 Such corroboration
would have been highly unlikely when the sodomy was committed in a
private space.225 Likewise, a rape conviction required corroboration of
219. Note, too, that Justice White abandoned any pretense to an originalist methodology
when he reconceived Georgia's sodomy law as antihomosexual-in the teeth of the statute's
plain text and the legislature's express goal of extending the law to cover male-female cunnilin-
gus when it amended the statute in 1968. See infra Appendix.
220. Oral sex was hardly unknown to the Anglo-American world before 1879. It was, for
example, obliquely described in JOHN CLELAND, FANNY HILL: MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEA-
SURE 42-43 (Dell rev. ed. 1964) (1749), a bawdy novel banned as obscene in many states. (I owe
this reference to Professor Courtney Howland.)
221. Some appalling things might have been prosecuted as "lewdness," but there is no re-
ported case of that type that I have found for the nineteenth century, and lewdness at common
law required public conduct.
222. See 2 BIsHOP, supra note 97, § 1027, at 731; see also, e.g., Davis v. State, 3 H. & J. 154,
154 (Md. 1810) (stating defendant "with force and arms... did make an assault ... beat, wound,
and illtreat" a 19-year-old youth).
223. See 2 BISHOP, supra note 97, § 1027, at 731; see also People v. Hodgkin, 53 N.W. 794
(Mich. 1892) (describing Michigan law and citing generally to Bishop on Criminal Law).
224. See WHARTON, supra note 104, at 443.
225. For example, in Medis v. State, 11 S.W. 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889), Milton Werner, the
person being sodomized, was the only witness to penetration. Two other witnesses saw defendant
Charles Medis (but not defendant Ed Hill) atop Werner. The witnesses heard Werner exclaim
that he would be "served" next. When the witnesses made their presence known, all three par-
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the complaining witness unless she could show that she had actively
resisted. In both rape and sodomy, there was no corroboration re-
quirement for minors, who were legally incapable of consent.226 For
the foregoing reasons, I have not seen a reported case in the United
States before 1900 where it is clear that a sodomy conviction was up-
held against a man engaged in private consensual intercourse with an-
other adult man, as Hardwick was.227
A third possible rationale for sodomy laws was their reinforce-
ment of traditional gender roles in sexual intercourse-a thrusting ag-
gressive male penetrating a receptive female with his penis. This
would have been a more comprehensible rationale to the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment than those of the Fifth, because the Civil
War period was the time when gender roles were hardening. In the big
cities of the North, Midwest, and West sodomy laws became seriously
enforced only after gender "inverts" became a troubling public specta-
cle. Under this normalizing regime, Michael Hardwick might have
been characterized as a gender invert, because he had another man's
penis in his mouth. But this option, too, was unavailable to Justice
White, because of the Court's sex discrimination precedents. Starting
with Frontiero v. Richardson2 8 and Craig v. Boren,2 29 a line of
Supreme Court decisions rejected legal rules grounded or defended
on the basis of traditional stereotypes about male and female roles. In
light of these precedents, Justice White was not about to criminalize
Hardwick for violating male gender expectations.
Instead, he faulted Hardwick for being a "homosexual" sodomite.
In so doing, Justice White opted for a twentieth-century rather than
nineteenth-century justification for sodomy laws, as part of a regime
of compulsory heterosexuality. Under the historically recent regime of
compulsory heterosexuality, it is only "homosexual sodomy," and not
"heterosexual sodomy" that is at issue. Justice White's exegesis of sod-
omy laws around the homo/heterosexual dichotomy would have been,
literally, incomprehensible to the Framers. The word "homosexual"
was not coined until 1868 and did not reach the United States until
1892; "heterosexuality" came even later to the lexicon.2 30 The concept
of "homosexual sodomy" would likewise have been meaningless to
the Framers and would certainly not have been an organizing princi-
ticipants jumped away, and Werner responded to the witnesses' intent to charge Medis and Hill,
by saying he "did not care a d-n." The court reversed the Medis and Hill convictions because
Werner was a consenting accomplice whose testimony as to penetration was not corroborated.
226. See 1 WHARTON, supra note 105, at 512.
227. In People v. Hickey, 109 Cal. 275 (1895), for example, the state supreme court affirmed
an appellate court decision to grant a new trial. There was a charge of assault as well as sodomy,
but the court also stated in dictum that sodomy could be established notwithstanding consent.
See id. at 276.
228. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
229. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
230. See JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 10 (1995).
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pie for them. Nor can it be shown that the Framers believed same-sex
sodomy was any more reprehensible than other kinds of sodomy. Fol-
lowing the common law, nineteenth-century sodomy laws applied to
male-female as well as male-male sodomy; most statutes, such as
Georgia's, did not apply to female-female sodomy. Excluding the
large number of decisions that did not reveal the sex or even the spe-
cies of the parties involved,231 the reported appellate cases from the
nineteenth century fell into three roughly equal groups: bestiality with
barnyard animals,232 sex between an adult man and a boy or
"youth,' 233 and man-man and man-woman cases, typically involving
coercion.2 34 There are no reported cases involving woman-woman
sodomy. One would read the pre-1900 cases in vain to find any men-
tion of or reference to homosexuality. The main concern was the com-
mission of nonprocreative acts outside of marriage; a secondary
concern was predation by men against youths, women, and animals; a
later concern was inversion of gender roles. There was no concern
with policing homosexuality, a specifically same-sex eroticism whose
existence was not even recognized.
Thus, Justice White's choice of a normalizing regime for sodomy
laws had nothing to do with the expectations of the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century legislatures that adopted such laws, or of the
Framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. His choice was his
choice, not the Framers' choice. His choice was rooted in twentieth-
century law's creation of the "homosexual" as the object of criminal-
ization and erasure. His choice tracked the choice made by seven state
legislatures in the 1970s and two state high courts after Hardwick,
which reconfigured sodomy law around homosexual conduct and not
231. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 34 La. Ann. 87 (La. 1882); Commonwealth v. Dill, 36 N.E.
472 (Mass. 1894); People v. Hodgkin, 53 N.W. 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1892); Fennell v. State, 32
Tex. 378 (1869); Ex parte Bergen, 14 Tex. App. 52 (1883); Williams v. Commonwealth, 22 S.E.
859 (Va. 1895).
232. See Bradford v. State, 16 So. 107 (Ala. 1894) (defendant accused of intercourse with a
cow); Collins v. State, 73 Ga. 76 (1884) (bestiality); State v. Frank, 15 S.W. 330 (Mo. 1891) (dog);
State v. Campbell, 29 Tex. 44 (1867) (mare); Cross v. State, 17 Tex. Ct. App. 476 (1895) (mare);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 4 Va. 307 (1812) (mare).
233. See Hodges v. State, 19 S.E. 758, 758 (Ga. 1894) (molesting a boy under 14 years of
age); Honselman v. People, 48 N.E. 304, 306 (Ill. 1897) (affirming conviction for oral sex with 14-
year-old boy); Davis v. State, 3 H. & J. 154, 154 (Md. 1810) (affirming conviction for assault on
19-year-old "youth"); Commonwealth v. Snow, 111 Mass. 411, 413 (1873) (seducing a "boy");
Territory v. Mahaffey, 3 Mont. 112, 114 (1878) (affirming conviction for seduction of a 14-year-
old boy); Prindle v. State, 21 S.W. 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (reversing conviction for having
oral sex with an adolescent boy).
234. See People v. Hickey, 41 P. 1047 (Cal. 1895) (involving man charged with assault and
sodomy with another man); People v. Moore, 37 P. 510, 511 (Cal. 1894) (same); Foster v. State, 1
Ohio Cir. Dec. 467, 469 (Ohio Cir. 1886) (discussing case of three defendants charged with gang
raping a fourth man); Lewis v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896) (discussing defend-
ant who committed oral and anal sex with woman); Medis v. State, 11 S.W. 112, 113 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1889) (reversing the conviction of two men charged with sodomy of a third man because
the only evidence of penetration came from the third man who consented to the conduct).
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just acts.23 5 Understood in this way, Justice White was upholding pro-
scriptions that had neither "ancient roots," nor sanctification by "mil-
lennia of moral teaching." The "roots" of Justice White's focus on
homosexuality were, instead, the middle-class anxiety about urbanized
sexuality and medicalization of sex in the post-Reconstruction period
of American history. According to historian Carroll Smith-Rosenberg,
the same combination of anxiety and medicalization fueled the mid-
dle-class male efforts to regulate woman's bodies through laws
criminalizing abortion, prostitution, and contraception.236 In other
words, the homosexual was simply the last in a string of medical nam-
ings, after the abortionist and the prostitute, by a society seeking to
maintain the norm of male-dominated procreative marriage.
Mark this irony. Implicitly, Hardwick contrasted abortion and
contraception, which were not crimes at common law (and therefore
might merit due process protection), with sodomy, which was a crime
(and therefore unworthy of due process protection). But the sodomy
that was a crime at common law was male-female as well as male-male
rape-like anal sex-not consent-like oral sex or female-female sex or
even "homosexual sodomy" as such. Oral sex was not a crime until the
period 1879-1921; female-female oral sex was not a crime in most ju-
risdictions until well into the twentieth century; and "homosexual sod-
omy" was not even a concept until this century, and was not a key
regulatory concept before the 1920s. In contrast, a mother's abortion
before quickening became a crime in many jurisdictions before the
Civil War2 3 7 and distributing contraceptives became a widely regarded
crime in the Reconstruction period 21S-in both instances before pri-
vate, consensual oral sex was a crime in a single American state. This
turns Justice White's historical syllogism on its head: If the reference
point is what the common law protected, or did not prohibit, in 1868
(when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified), Michael Hardwick's
conduct (not a crime anywhere until 1879 and afterward) makes out a
better case for originalist protection than Estelle Griswold's conduct
(a crime in some states by 1868) or Jane Roe's conduct (a crime in
almost all states by 1868).
B. Should Hardwick Be Overruled?
Hardwick's antihomosexual rhetoric and questionable reasoning
deprive it of at least some of the authority that derives from the
Court's exercise of reasoned judgment, and lawyers and judges ought
to read and apply Hardwick cautiously. This process is already afoot.
Since 1986, Nevada, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia have
235. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
236. See SMrH-ROSENBERG, supra note 48, at 178-81.
237. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regu-
lation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 282 (1992).
238. See State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 860 (Conn. 1940).
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repealed their consensual sodomy laws, the highest state courts in
Kentucky and Montana have invalidated their consensual sodomy
laws under their state constitutions, a dispositive intermediate court
decision in Tennessee has done the same, and nonbinding decisions in
Michigan and Texas have said that their consensual sodomy laws are
inconsistent with their state constitutions.23 9 In reported decisions af-
ter 1986, judges have generally not applied sodomy laws to private sex
between consenting adults. Instead, judges have relied on Hardwick
to deny equality rights to lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, but those
denials now face difficulties in light of Romer v. Evans.24°
Should the Supreme Court overrule Hardwick? Stare decisis, the
rule that even questionable precedents should not be reconsidered, is
not so strong a rule in constitutional cases as in common-law and stat-
utory cases, and the Rehnquist Court has overruled constitutional
precedents frequently.241 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 42 where
the Court reaffirmed a diluted version of Roe, the plurality opinion
expressed doubt about the reasoning and analytical framework of Roe
but insisted upon further inquiry before deciding whether to overrule
it. The Casey inquiries are relevant to Hardwick, especially whether
its central rule
could be removed without serious inequity to those who have re-
lied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society
governed by [the rule in question]; whether the law's growth in
the intervening years has left [Hardwick's] central rule a doctrinal
anachronism discounted by society; and whether [Hardwick's]
premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing [time period]
as to render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifi-
able in dealing with the issue it addressed.243
Consider these factors in reverse order.
1. Faulty Premises?
Hardwick's faulty history undermines the continued justifiability
of the precedent: Roe and Griswold are not easily distinguishable
from Hardwick, and the Court is left with no persuasive answer to the
Millian reading of the privacy precedents-one that would protect
Hardwick. But the critique does not stop with the Court's ahistorical
historicism. At root, the main "factual premises" the Court got wrong
were its apparent assumptions about "homosexual sodomy" and
about gay people. John Jeffries's sympathetic biography of Justice
239. See infra Appendix references for each state.
240. Compare the majority (relying on Hardwick) and dissenting opinions (relying on Ev-
ans) in Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
241. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting "[s]tare decisis is not an
inexorable command").
242. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
243. Id. at 855 (bracketed material added to tailor Casey's criteria to Hardwick).
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Powell, the most ambivalent of the Hardwick majority, demonstrates
that the critical fifth vote came from a man who was unwilling to give
gay people equal constitutional rights, because he considered sodomy
personally repulsive and "homosexuals" completely alien.244 The
Chief Justice's gratuitous concurring opinion, and his feverish lobby-
ing of Powell to change his original vote,24 5 suggests that Burger was
particularly threatened by homosexuality. This degree of homophobia
is understandable for men of their generation, but its taint undermines
the Court's claim to be a neutral arbiter of law.
As a matter of fact, gay people are normal human beings and not
kooky aliens. Scientists have found gay people to be biologically as
sound and psychologically as functional as straight people.246 Same-
sex intimacy, too, is a normal expression of sexuality. Most societies in
world history have not vested gender and heterosexuality with the so-
cial significance our culture has, and even other western societies are
much more accepting of the concept of benign sexual and gender vari-
ation.2 47 The most respectable intellectual arguments supporting anti-
gay policies, such as those endorsed in Hardwick, are natural law
arguments.248 But the procreative marriage-based regime of natural
law, which is much more offended by abortion (the asserted taking of
human life) than sodomy, is inconsistent with the constitutional re-
gime of Griswold and Roe v. Wade. Again following society, the
Supreme Court long ago crossed the Rubicon on these issues, moving
from sectarian natural law thinking, toward a philosophy of sexual pri-
vacy and toleration of sexual variation.
Although decided only ten years after Hardwick, Evans reflects a
fact-based viewpoint that is about fifty years ahead. Not only did the
Court politely refer to gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals by the termi-
244. See JEFFRIES, supra note 12, at 515, 518, 521, 528-29.
245. See id. at 523-24.
246. The classic citations are ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE (1948), and ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE
(1953); Evelyn Hooker, Male Homosexuality in the Rorschach, 22 J. PROJECTIVE TECHS. 33
(1958), and Evelyn Hooker, The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual, 21 J. PROJECTIVE
TECHS. 18 (1957); Sigmund Freud's famous "Letter to an American Mother," excerpted in Es-
KRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 36, at 143-44. Modern authorities are collected in HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES (William Paul et al. eds., 1982);
HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (John C. Gonsiorek & James
D. Weinrich eds., 1991). See also accounts from disciplines traditionally hostile to homosexuality,
KENNETH LEWES, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY (1988); MICHAEL
RUSE, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1988).
247. For accounts from different perspectives of sexual and gender variation across time and
cultures, see CLELLAN S. FORD & FRANK A. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1951);
POSNER, supra note 14; THE MANY FACES OF HOMOSEXUALITY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL AP-
PROACHES TO HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR (Evelyn Blackwood ed., 1986); RITUALIZED HOMOSEX-
UALITY IN MELANESIA (Gilbert H. Herdt ed., 1984).
248. See John Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049 (1994). But compare Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO.
L.J. 261 (1995), with Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagina-
tion, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1993).
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 673 1999
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
nology they prefer, but it treated them as citizens and not alien sex
fiends or presumptive criminals. This treatment was a reflection of the
political progress gay people have made: Once objects of state era-
sure, gay people have not only survived but have become a commu-
nity entitled to a place in American pluralism of which the Court is a
guarantor. The fact that gay people are normal, or virtually normal,
and partners in American pluralist politics surely inspired Justice
Anthony Kennedy's decision to open his Evans opinion with the
premise of the first Justice John Harlan's Plessy dissent: "[Tihe Con-
stitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'" 49
What Harlan was arguing was that the polity could not long maintain
an apartheid that officially denied the humanity and citizenship of a
robust group, people of color. Kennedy's opinion can be read the
same way: The apartheid of the closet that Hardwick ratified for gay
people is as socially unproductive as racial apartheid.
Once Linda Brown refused to attend segregated schools and
Rosa Parks refused to sit in the back of the bus, state-sponsored racial
apartheid was doomed. Once Harry Hay and Del Martin refused to
accept the law's characterization of them as criminals and psycho-
paths,250 a state-sponsored apartheid of the closet was doomed. Hard-
wick ratified antigay apartheid in a similar way that Plessy ratified
racial apartheid. Resting upon the core idea of the Plessy dissent, Ev-
ans is best read as an effort to end a state-supported apartheid of the
closet and to take antigay Kulturkampf off national and state regula-
tory agendas. This is a socially useful goal. To the extent Hardwick
remains a symbol of antigay Kulturkampf because of its antigay rheto-
ric and biased reasoning, it is an albatross of the law.
2. Doctrinal Anachronism?
Hardwick contributed to a national and, indeed, international de-
bate over whether consensual same-sex intimacy between adults
should be criminalized. Learned opinion has overwhelmingly opposed
the result and reasoning of Hardwick.251 This is reflected in the re-
markable post-Hardwick legal developments. Hardwick has been
shunned like a pariah of the law.
249. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). Evans, handed down May 20, 1996, was delivered 100 years, almost to
the day, after Plessy, which was delivered on May 18, 1896; probably the only reason it was not
the same day was that May 18, 1996, was a Saturday.
250. These were early gay liberationists. Their story, and those of women and men like
them, is told in JoHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNmES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINoRrry IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983).
251. See Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 645-46 n.95 (1990) (citing 33 law review articles and
comments critical of Bowers). The list of post-1990 critics includes openly heterosexual conserva-
tives such as Richard Posner and Charles Fried, as well as other authors from a variety of per-
spectives. See sources cited supra notes 14-19.
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In the wake of Hardwick, gaylegal challenges to sodomy laws
shifted from the U.S. Constitution to state constitutions and met with
increasing success. In Commonwealth v. Wasson, 2  a divided Ken-
tucky Supreme Court invalidated its law criminalizing consensual "de-
viate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex," as
inconsistent with the Kentucky Constitution's right to privacy as well
as an Evans-like reading of equal protection.253 Finding Hardwick's
originalism "misdirected" and its assumptions ignorant, the Kentucky
court applied to gay people the principle that "[i]t is not within the
competency of government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and
to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned, or
to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not directly in-
jure society., 254 Montana and Tennessee have similarly nullified their
same-sex only sodomy laws as inconsistent with state constitutional
rights to privacy.255 Ironically, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated
its consensual sodomy law in 1998 on state constitutional privacy
grounds that parallel the analysis of the Hardwick dissenters.256 Pri-
vacy claims in other states have been rejected on the ground that the
parties presenting them were not engaged in noncommercial private
sex between consenting adults.257
State courts have not accorded Hardwick the respect they nor-
mally give Supreme Court decisions. Even the Supreme Court itself
has been wary of the decision. The joint opinion in Casey ignored
Hardwick and rejected its originalist methodology for figuring the
contours of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. "Neither
the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects., 258 Remarkably, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg,259 which rejected a general due process right to die,
failed to cite Hardwick, even though the opinion sought to revive
Hardwick's methodology of declining to recognize a substantive due
252. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
253. Id. at 488, 495-97.
254. Id. at 494-95 (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 385 (Ky. 1909)).
255. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 125-26 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
256. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
257. See Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996); State v. Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973 (La.
1995) (public sex); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987) (commercial sex); State v. Walsh,
713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (public sex; reserving state constitutional issue); State v. Lopes, 660
A.2d 707 (R.I. 1995) (forcible sex); State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994) (refusing to
decide constitutional issue when parties had not engaged in prohibited homosexual conduct).
258. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992). In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989), Justice Scalia's position that the Due Process Clause protects only those prac-
tices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against state interference in 1868,
was rejected by a majority of Justices, including concurring Justice O'Connor, later an author of
the joint opinion in Casey. See id. at 112, 127 n.6.
259. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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process right not specifically established in the common law tradi-
tion. 6' Although the Court in Glucksberg unanimously rejected a
general right to die, five Justices left open or seemed friendly to a
"constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances
of his or her imminent death," especially to avoid pain. 61
International experience supports the proposition that laws
criminalizing same-sex intimacy are anachronistic for modern urban-
ized societies. Virtually all the countries with laws against consensual
sodomy are nonindustrialized societies.2 62 Japan, Hong Kong, China,
Taiwan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Columbia,
Venezuela, and most of the states in Europe have no consensual sod-
omy laws. The few straggler countries or provinces have been sub-
jected to legal as well as political pressure to abandon laws that are
anachronistic for modern urbanized societies that have sizeable gay
populations. In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 63 the European Court
of Human Rights ruled that Northern Ireland's consensual sodomy
prohibition contravened the right to privacy set forth in Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court subsequently
applied Dudgeon to declare the sodomy laws of Ireland and Cyprus
similarly in derogation of the Convention, thereby completing a clean
sweep of such regulations in the European Community (EC).2 6 The
Constitutional Court of South Africa invalidated its sodomy and un-
natural relations laws in 1998 on grounds of privacy and in an opinion
well worth study.265
Like the United States, Australia is a federal system composed of
several states. After Hardwick, only one state in Australia, Tasmania,
continued to proscribe private, consensual sex between adult men. In
1992, the Human Rights Commissioner in Australia asked the federal
government to override Tasmania's law. The Commissioner found
that the Tasmanian law clearly breached Australia's obligations under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] by
failing to provide homosexuals equality under the law and for breach-
ing their right to privacy. Upon petition of the Tasmanian Gay and
260. See id. at 719-24. The Court returned to a Casey-like, evolving history approach to
privacy in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
261. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 738-52 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 721-36 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 789-92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
262. See James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 64-66 (1994); see also Rob Tielmon & Hans Hammelburg,
World Survey on the Social and Legal Positions of Gays and Lesbians, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK:
A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY LIERATION AND OPPRESSION 249-342 (Aart Hendriks
et al. eds., 1993) (country-by-country review).
263. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981).
264. See Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 10-11 (1993); Norris v. Ireland,
142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17-18 (1988).
265. See Highest Court Strikes Down Laws Banning Homosexual Relations in South Africa,
L.A. TimES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A3.
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Lesbian Rights Group, the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
in Toonen v. Australia,26 6 ruled that Tasmania's policy violated article
17(1) of the ICCPR, which protects against "arbitrary or unlawful in-
terference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. '26 7 Tasmania complied
by repealing its consensual sodomy law in 1997.268
Toonen is of special significance, because the United States has
also signed and ratified the ICCPR.26 9 Thus, the United States has
accepted international obligations under the Covenant, although it has
not made itself amenable to international adjudication of grievances
before the Human Rights Committee, nor is the treaty self-executing
in American courts. On the other hand, the United States has ex-
pressed a readiness to take such "measures as may be necessary to
ensure that the States of the Union implement the rights guaranteed
by the Covenant. ' 27' After Toonen, the Committee expressed specific
concern "at the serious infringement of private life in some States [of
the United States] which classify as a criminal offence sexual relations
between consenting adult partners of the same sex carried out in pri-
vate."'2 71 The ICCPR would not alone justify the Supreme Court's
overruling of Hardwick, but the international obligation created in the
wake of Toonen ought to be considered by the Court when it inter-
prets domestic law, including constitutional law.272 Additionally,
Toonen and the post-Dudgeon EC decisions are subsequent develop-
ments that support a reconsideration of precedent and, more point-
edly, that highlight the anachronistic quality of Hardwick's rule and its
reasoning.
266. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th sess., 448th mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/
1992 (1994).
267. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
268. See Tasman Sodomy Laws Repealed, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 17, 1997, at 14.
269. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 172.
270. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Cove-
nant, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 (1995).
271. Id. 91 22.
272. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718-19 n.16 (1997) (considering legal rules
followed in other industrialized countries before deciding not to recognize a general "right to
die"). American courts are supposed to interpret federal law to be consistent with America's
international commitments and customary international law, even if they are not otherwise judi-
cially enforceable. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(Marshall, C.J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1987). Non-self-executing treaties "may sometimes be held to be federal policy
superseding State law or policy." Id. § 115 cmt. (e); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
For an argument that Toonen more directly requires overruling Hardwick, see James D. Wilets,
Using International Law to Vindicate the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians in United States
Courts, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 33 (1995).
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3. Public Reliance on Hardwick?
Although Hardwick is a recent precedent, the sodomy laws it rat-
ified existed long before and had been slanted by a Hardwick-like
homophobia for decades. Most openly antihomosexual policies sup-
ported by sodomy laws (such as exclusions of gay people from the civil
service) have been rescinded, but certain policies might be unsettled if
Hardwick were to be overruled. Police policies in some jurisdictions,
mostly in the South, would have to be rethought. Could local vice
squads arrest people for having sex in public toilets, automobiles,
erotic nightclubs, or adult bookstores? For soliciting decoy cops for
private sex? In all these situations, right of privacy challenges have
sometimes been successful in state courts.2 73 The most important na-
tional policy that would be unsettled by overruling Hardwick is the
armed forces' exclusion of lesbian, gay, and bisexual personnel. The
exclusion is defended in part as a corollary to the military's criminal
prohibition of sodomy. Gay soldiers can be excluded either because
they commit sodomy, or because they have a "propensity" to commit
sodomy.274 If Hardwick were overruled, the consensual sodomy prohi-
bition in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) would be
more vulnerable to constitutional attack. Because the Supreme Court
strongly defers to military statutes and regulations that would be inva-
lid if adopted in a civilian context or by the states,275 the UCMJ's un-
constitutionality would not be a foregone conclusion, however. (One
possible resolution would be for the Court to allow the armed forces
to prohibit sodomy on military premises but not in soldiers' homes or
off-base.) Nonetheless, the sodomy prohibition would be more vulner-
able without Hardwick, and if the sodomy prohibition fell there would
be fewer arguments left to the defenders of the military exclusion of
gay people. On the other hand, the military's propensity argument
might be questioned even if the armed forces could criminalize con-
sensual sodomy.276
Although overruling Hardwick could unsettle some policies,
many of the issues identified above could be stabilized by a cautious
approach to an overruling, such as letting Hardwick bleed for several
years and then overruling it, or even just ignoring it. More important,
273. See People v. Triggs, 506 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1973) (public toilet); Commonwealth v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (solicitation of decoy cop); People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652
(Mich. App. 1981) (public toilet); People v. Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983) (solicitation);
People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (automobile); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415
A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (erotic club); Honeycutt v. State, 690 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
(automobiles); Leibman v. State, 652 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (adult bookstore).
274. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing the new policy);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same).
275. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 37 (1981).
276. See generally David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
319 (1994).
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the policies that would be most unsettled are among the least defensi-
ble. Toilet stakeouts and decoy operations, for example, are a lavish
deployment of scarce police resources in cities with high rates of vio-
lent crime. Most important, overruling Hardwick would have poten-
tially affirmative effects on public policy discourse. Consider a few.
a. Mutuality as the Prerequisite to Sexual Intimacy
A criticism of Hardwick, offered above, is that it aligns the sym-
bolic power of law with the wrong normative regime. When Hardwick
emphasized an antihomosexual policy for sodomy laws, it not only
chose an unproductive policy, but the Court missed an opportunity to
stress a productive policy. The norm for sexual intimacy that has been
advanced by feminist and gaylegal theory is mutuality: sex is good and
normal when the participants welcome it, when the sex is truly a joint
enterprise meeting the needs of the partners.277 A danger posed by
Hardwick is the suggestion to men that their intercourse with women
is validated, in part, by the mere fact of its heterosexuality. This par-
tial validation threatens to deflect attention from the mutuality goal.
This criticism of Hardwick should be tempered by the realization
that sodomy law has long been moving toward a regime of mutuality.
All the states now regulate "forcible" sodomy, and "ordinary" sod-
omy prosecutions since 1969 have usually involved situations where
the sex is alleged to be unwelcome. 278 For example, in Schochet v.
State,279 the defendant was accused of raping and sodomizing a wo-
man he met at a bar; he admitted to oral and penile-vaginal sex with
her but claimed it was consensual. The jury acquitted Schochet of all
rape and forcible sodomy charges and convicted him only of consen-
sual sodomy.280 The Maryland Court of Appeals overturned that con-
viction by interpreting its sodomy law to exclude consensual
heterosexual sodomy.281 On the one hand, prosecutors use sodomy
laws in rape cases to enhance the odds that the defendant will be con-
victed of something even if the jury disbelieves the complaining wit-
ness's testimony that she was coerced. Given the difficulty of winning
convictions in cases of "real rape," this may not seem unjust. On the
other hand, this strategy might make it too easy for juries to escape
the difficult issues of consent and settle on sodomy as an acceptable
compromise, and might make it too easy for a jury to imprison a per-
son who in fact was falsely accused of rape.
277. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality
Tale About the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37 (1993);
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 777 (1988).
278. See Backer, supra note 277, at 95-118 (discussing merger of sodomy and rape).
279. 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
280. See id. at 180.
281. See id. at 186; accord Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
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b. Preventing the Spread of HIV
One of the amicus briefs filed in Hardwick argued that sodomy
laws are justified as a way to prevent the spread of HIV, the virus that
causes AIDS.282 The Supreme Court correctly ignored the argument.
Anal sex can and does transmit HIV, just as penile-vaginal sex can
and does transmit HIV-but oral sex (now considered sodomy) does
not as clearly or easily transmit HIV. Moreover, prohibiting oral sex
contributes little if anything to slowing the public health menace
called AIDS. The act (anal versus penile-vaginal sex) is not so impor-
tant in transmission as the failure to use a condom correctly. By focus-
ing attention on the sexual act rather than on the safety of the sex,
sodomy laws divert attention from the most productive way to fight
the disease-education about the risks of all kinds of sex and about
the utility of safer sex techniques. Sodomy laws may even be counter-
productive, as when they are invoked to oppose public school sex and
AIDS education and condom distribution programs. Public health ex-
perts believe education and condom distribution are the best ways to
fight AIDS.283 Thus far, there is no empirical evidence that such meas-
ures increase the sexual activity that sodomy laws prohibit.284
Even if sodomy rather than unsafe sex contributed decisively to
the spread of HIV, laws prohibiting sodomy would not necessarily
help fight the disease. Ever since the Kinsey group reported that
ninety-five percent of American men had violated one or more of the
popular sex laws, including sodomy laws, it has been unclear whether
sex laws substantially and predictably deter the conduct they forbid.
Not only is the risk of detection minuscule (and therefore the deter-
rence value nil), but the forbidden zone created by consensual sex
laws helps create lines that make the forbidden fruit all that much
sweeter. The primary deterrent effect of consensual sodomy laws is to
keep sex in the closet, hidden and underground, precisely the terrain
that bred and spread HIV in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many
public health professionals believe that sodomy laws modestly impede
AIDS programs by discouraging people from being tested for the vi-
rus or treated for the disease, and by pushing prohibited sex into dark
corners unilluminated by education and safer sex guidelines.285
282. See Brief of David Robinson, Jr., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140), microformed on CIS U.S. Supreme Court Records
and Briefs, No. 85-140-5 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
283. See AIDS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES 33-36 (David Karp & Ronald Bayer
eds., 1992).
284. See generally Ralph Hingson et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Transmis-
sion: Changes in Knowledge and Behaviors Among Teenagers, Massachusetts Statewide Surveys
1986 to 1988, 85 PEDIATRICS 24 (1990).
285. See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 263-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); TOMAS J.
PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPI-
DEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 148 (1993). The amicus brief of the American Public
Health Association argued that, due to fear of sodomy prosecution, some people do not report
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c. Eroding the Act = Status Argument
As Janet Halley has said, sodomy is the metonym for the homo-
sexual.286 Homosexual identity is defined by presumptions about ho-
mosexual conduct. Because Hardwick ratifies state prohibition of
homosexual conduct, it is regularly, albeit decreasingly, invoked as a
basis for denying gay people equal treatment. According to the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, "[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable
as a. .. felony," and that is an "important consideration in determin-
ing custody" of a woman's biological child.287 The state court debate
in child custody and adoption cases has spilled over into the federal
cases evaluating the military exclusion of gays. Judicial rulings dis-
criminating against gay litigants regularly deny they are discriminating
based on sexual orientation. Citing Hardwick, they can plausibly say
they are merely regulating problematic conduct.288 At a more abstract
level, opponents of gay rights reject analogies to race or sex or even
religious discrimination on the ground that antigay discrimination is
based on conduct rather than status.
Perhaps this is no longer true. Evans is the antonym of Hardwick.
Judges are no longer constrained by Hardwick in equal protection
cases and can follow Evans's lead if they choose to do so. But judges
desiring to reject challenges to antigay policies can follow Hardwick
and limit Evans to its unusual facts. This lack of authoritative gui-
dance is not a terrible state of affairs and is probably what the
Supreme Court expected after Evans: State courts and lower federal
courts will struggle with issues of sexual orientation discrimination on
a case-by-case basis, less constrained by Supreme Court precedent be-
cause of the Hardwick-versus-Evans choice now available. At some
point, however, the Supreme Court will have to choose: Hardwick?
Or Evans?
C. Larger Historiographical Lessons: Original Intent and
Constitutional Interpretation
The premise of Justice White's opinion in Hardwick was that the
Court should be chary of creating new constitutional rights unless sup-
ported by the original intent of those who framed the Constitution or,
in the case at hand, the Fourteenth Amendment. The foregoing histo-
riography illustrates problems with original intent as a method of con-
stitutional interpretation and provides a response to the most
plausible defense to originalism as a governing methodology.
or seek medical treatment for venereal disease infection, while others are reluctant to be tested
to determine if they are infected. See id.
286. See Halley, supra note 13, at 1737.
287. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995).
288. See the debate between Judges Silberman and Wald in Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), and between Judges Norris and Reinhardt in Watkins v. U.S. Army,
847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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The main problems with originalism z8 are well illustrated by my
critique of Hardwick. Although the defenders of originalism claim
that it is more objective than other methods of interpretation and
therefore better constrains interpreters, Hardwick illustrates the slip-
periness of originalism. Justice White's insistence that only "homosex-
ual sodomy" was at issue was driven by his desire to distance the case
before him from the contraception and abortion cases, but Justice
White then posed the historical question in impossibly anachronistic
terms. His originalist approach to the right of privacy in this particular
case was in stark contrast to his own and the Court's nonoriginalist
approach to the right of privacy in the contraception cases, to the
Court's nonoriginalist approach to the right of privacy in the post-Roe
v. Wade abortion cases, and to his strongly dynamic approach to sod-
omy laws in Hardwick itself. The behind-the-scenes reports suggest
that original intent was just a cover story for a decision made on other
grounds.
The biggest problem for originalism is the indeterminate nature
of an originalist inquiry into an old text. Applying an old text to un-
foreseen circumstances is an intrinsically difficult endeavor, dramati-
cally illustrated by the case of "homosexual sodomy." Although
Justice White correctly observed that most states had sodomy laws in
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and about half
still had them in 1986, when Hardwick was decided, that historical
continuity masked changes that affected every other feature of the
constitutional question:
(1) What was it that sodomy laws prohibited? In 1868, the com-
mon law refused to say much about what was a "crime
against nature"-except that it did not include oral sex. In
1986, oral sex was synonymous with sodomy.
(2) What goal(s) did sodomy laws serve? In 1868, the main goal
was state insistence that sex be within the institution of pro-
creative marriage. By 1986, that goal was not one the state
could constitutionally pursue.
(3) What was the relationship between sodomy and homosexual-
ity? In 1868, there was no English-language term for same-
sex attraction. By 1986, homosexuality had become a cultur-
ally totalizing term.
Because the issue before the Court in Hardwick was so different from
the issues debated in the Reconstruction era, there was not even an
objective or neutral way to frame the interpretive question.
289. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Paul Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205-09 (1980); Daniel A.
Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085; Mark J.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
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There are some ways of framing the question that are less neutral
than others, however. The exemplar of nonneutrality is the way Jus-
tice White set the originalist inquiry: Would the Framers have consid-
ered homosexual sodomy a protected activity? A more neutral
originalist inquiry would have been something closer to the following:
If the Framers had been asked about oral sex between two men in a
private home, would they have understood that to be protected from
state police intrusion? There is substantial evidence that people in the
1860s would have answered "yes" to that question, but they might
have answered "no" to this variation: If the Framers had been asked
about oral sex between two men in a private home, would they have
understood such conduct to receive affirmative protection from the
constitutional amendment they were drafting?
To be true to a reconstructive inquiry, however, the question
would have to be more complex, such as the following: If the Framers
could have foreseen that colonies of men would form in the nation's
cities, for the purpose of engaging in oral sex and masturbation with
one another, renouncing marriage and their natural gender role,
would they have wanted this conduct protected from police regulation
once the communities became alarmed? Put that way, the Framers
might have said "no," but another way of putting the complex ques-
tion could just as well trigger a "yes": If the Framers could have fore-
seen that laws prohibiting contraception and abortion would be held
to violate the amendment they drafted, because the amendment was
construed to encode a right to sexual privacy, would the Framers have
felt that oral sex between consenting adults in the privacy of their
home was distinguishable? And so on.
The argument for originalism is neither its objectivity nor its con-
straint-for originalism has neither quality-but is instead its conser-
vatism. If the burden of persuasion rests with the party asserting a
constitutional right, originalism makes it harder to recognize new
rights or expand recognized rights to new situations. (Of course, any
constitutional methodology can start with this kind of conservative
presumption against judicial invalidation.) Indeed, that is surely what
Justice White had in mind when he warned that the Court's legitimacy
is most in peril when it expands nontextual constitutional rights, like
privacy, without support in the Framers' original expectations. Yet it
was Justice White's originalist opinion that landed the Court into le-
gitimacy trouble. The reason has to do with another critique of
originalism: its insistence that law is only a matter of vertical coher-
ence (this interpretation is consistent with all that came before), with
no theoretical room for horizontal coherence (this interpretation is
consistent with other rights and rules today).
Originalism's limitation as a legitimating methodology can be il-
lustrated by the privacy cases themselves. Buck v. Bell-Justice
Holmes's snarly opinion accepting the constitutionality of forced ster-
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ilization-was an opinion perfectly supportable by a vertical under-
standing of constitutional law: Show me where there is a right to
sexual satisfaction in the Constitution or its contemporary under-
standing, and I'll recognize your right to be free from state interfer-
ence. But Holmes's position could not long survive the knowledge
that Nazi Germany deployed the same eugenic philosophy adopted in
Virginia to commit unspeakable human experimentation, nor could it
have survived Stephen Jay Gould's revelation decades later that Car-
rie Buck, the woman Virginia sterilized, was not mentally disabled, as
the state claimed.2" Constitutional law has a learning curve, and it
must include horizontal as well as vertical considerations if it is to re-
main the foundation of government's overall legitimacy. If the Consti-
tution's protection of "life, liberty, and property" does not assure
protection for productive mutual sexual expression between con-
senting adults, what meaning can due process possibly have for proper
governance? This was the question that sunk Judge Bork, and it may
ultimately sink Hardwick.
A principle arising from the Court's privacy cases involves not
just the ability of an individual to control her or his body, but also
involves the state's obligation to allow him space for individual and
relational development.29' Since the Skinner decision, which effec-
tively overruled Buck v. Bell, that development has included sexual
development, a precept that would have been anathema to the Fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but which to twentieth-century
post-Freudian culture is just as important as the property rights, right
to earn a living, and contract rights valued by the Framers. These val-
ues implicate horizontal pressures that weigh on the Court to overrule
or limit Hardwick.
Another horizontal development is the expansion of American
democracy. Only men voted on the Fourteenth Amendment, which in
turn is the only explicitly male-privileged provision of the Constitu-
tion. Who can deny today that women are equal citizens? A principle
arising from the Court's sex discrimination cases is that women must
share equally in the space and the opportunities, tailored in the case of
pregnancy to women's particular needs.29 2 Women's equality as citi-
zens-a proposition not accepted by the Framers but one now neces-
sary to the legitimacy of our government-strongly supports the
extension of privacy rights to reproductive liberties such as contracep-
tion and abortion (generally prohibited in the Reconstruction Era).
What women gained after World War II, gay people are now gaining
after Stonewall-a place at the table of American pluralism. Romer v.
Evans suggests that gay people cannot be segregated off from privacy
290. See Gould, supra note 35, at 336.
291. See Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 744-47.
292. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 83-
88 (1988).
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protections any more than women can be. A healthy pluralism that
includes lesbian, bisexual, and gay people as citizens is not one that
can tolerate the antihomosexual rhetoric of Bowers v. Hardwick, nor
one that should perpetuate the holding of an originalist decision so ill-
grounded in the historiography of the founding periods.
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